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Executive summary 
 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been defined as the “backbone of the 
European economy”, and are increasingly recognised as a major source of entrepreneurial 
skills, employment and innovation. In the EU25, some 23 million SMEs represent 99% of all 
enterprises, provide 75 million jobs and make a 55% contribution towards the creation of 
wealth: in addition, one third of employees and over two thirds of private-sector employees in 
Europe work in SMEs. Given their outstanding strategic importance, the European 
Commission has launched several policies to promote the development of SMEs, their access 
to finance and investment in R&D and innovation. 
A prominent role among EU programmes targeting SMEs is played by the Multi-Annual 
Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship 2001-2005 (MAP), funded by Community 
budget and co-financing instruments. The MAP has been extended until the end of 2006 to 
create a bridge with the forthcoming Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme 
(CIP), a very ambitious project that will run from 2007 to 2013. 
Against this background, the Budgetary Committee of the European Parliament requested the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) to evaluate the output of the MAP over the period 
2000-2005 in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and utility, by highlighting the 
value for money of the programmes and related actions, and emphasising whether the funds 
dedicated to their implementation have produced the expected quantitative and qualitative 
effects. Moreover, CEPS was asked to provide some orientations for the future generations of 
programmes, namely the CIP. In carrying out these activities, we decided to focus in 
particular on the actions undertaken between 2001 and 2006, as they provide more relevant 
and consistent information on the output of the MAP initiative and, in turn, better orientation 
for the forthcoming CIP.  
The findings of our evaluation of the MAP as well as a set of recommendations for the CIP 
are summarised below. 
 
MAP: structure and budget 
The MAP 2001-2005 budget amounts to around 450 million Euros. The structure of the 
Programme follows a specific Community intervention logic aiming at addressing all the 
various areas that affect European SMEs, and thus exhibits a multi-level structure stemming 
from general objectives to single projects. The Programme is structured along three pillars of 
intervention, in line with the overall goals of the Programme: 
 Policy development: under this pillar, the Commission, in close coordination with Member 
States, analyses and studies how to improve the overall environment in which enterprises 
operate. Within this field, particular attention is paid to the Best Procedure 
projects whereby the Commission and national administrations actively collaborate to 
gain a better understanding of the various issues of concern to businesses, exchange best 
practices and influence relevant policy choices. For the period 2001-2003 this pillar was 
allocated 11.3% of the total budget. 
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 Financial instruments: this pillar contains three schemes (the start-up scheme of the 
European Technology Facility (ETF), the SME Guarantee Facility, the Seed Capital 
Action Facility) managed by the European Investment Fund, that are specifically targeted 
at improving the financial environment for businesses, especially SMEs, by bridging the 
gaps that financial markets would otherwise normally leave open, and supporting SMEs 
over their whole life-cycle, from the pre-seed stage to the expansion stage. A fourth 
financial instrument was originally envisaged, the Joint European Venture (JEV) 
Programme, but such instrument is now being phased out due to lack of success, and is 
thus not to be included in the components of the financial pillar. For the period 2001-2003 
this pillar was allocated 70.3% of the total budget. 
 Euro Info Centres: these Centres were set up since 1987 to act as a key interface between 
European institutions and local actors. EICs play two fundamental roles: on the one hand, 
they inform, advise and assist SMEs in all Community related services, programmes and 
networks; on the other, they provide feedback to the Commission on SME concerns, needs 
and interests. The EIC Network currently consists in 282 points in 44 countries with 269 
centres in the EU25, the EEA and candidate countries and other associated structures and 
relay points in third countries bringing added value to the network. For the period 2001-
2003 this pillar was allocated 18.4% of the total budget. 
The figure below illustrates the main structure of the MAP.  
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Output of the MAP 2001-2005 
Our ex post evaluation highlighted that the quality of MAP outputs varied noticeably between 
and within pillars and produced an overall mixed result, with some actions being particularly 
effective and useful for SMEs, while others still exhibit a significant margin for improvement. 
Our conclusions, drawn on the basis of the selected evaluation criteria, are presented below. 
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General comments 
On a more general note, three factors played a crucial role in the overall performance of the 
MAP: a) the links between the different levels of the Programme’s structure; b) the quality of 
indicators used to evaluate the single projects; and c) the general communication strategy. 
First, as regards the Programme structure, in some cases the lack of a clear connection 
between the general goals and the specific pillars of the Programme hindered the 
implementation phase: problems could not always be detected in a timely manner, especially 
within the policy development pillar, and thus could not be solved.  
Secondly, available evaluations pointed out that the indicators selected to monitor the 
implementation of single projects were sometimes patchy or unclear. In some cases, they 
failed to reveal the real state of project implementation – for the 16 policy development 
projects surveyed in the Commission final report, as many as 12 out of 16 participation 
indicators did not reveal any relevant information – while in other situations they ended up 
being more objectives per se than measurement tools, because of the lack of operational focus 
of the project at hand. In addition, some indicators were not linked to any specific target and 
thus could not fulfil their measurement task. 
Finally, for what concerns the communications strategy, one of the most common criticisms 
elicited by the previous MAP (1997-2000) was the lack of an effective communication and 
dissemination strategy, both within and outside the European Commission. In the MAP 2001-
2005, some progress has been made, especially as regards communication within the 
Commission – with some notable exceptions, such as the under-exploitation of the 
information provided by EICs. However, too often potential beneficiaries are unaware of the 
existence of the MAP. Besides generating a lack of visibility of implemented policies and thus 
lower appreciation scores among final beneficiaries, this lack of communication resulted 
sometimes in missed opportunities. Thus, the full potential of the Programme and the positive 
spillover effects resulting from its successful implementation have been underexploited.  
 
Specific comments 
Relevance: actions undertaken under the MAP were generally relevant, as the structure of the 
Programme covered some major areas of SMEs needs.  
However, the three pillars seem to lack a holistic approach in supporting SMEs in their daily 
struggle to survive or to grow. Within the triangle of SMEs, financiers and intermediaries, the 
crucial role played by accountants and administrative offices (AOs) in closing the finance gap 
is not sufficiently addressed. These intermediaries are key in solving the problem of building 
the much needed credit history and financial/cash flow forecasts, and could play an important 
role in the credit assessment process, especially for starters and young small companies. 
These procedures will become more important with the coming of Basel II. A greater 
attention to these intermediaries could significantly decrease overhead costs (which are often 
prohibitive bottlenecks in the field of micro credits or small loans), at the same time 
significantly reducing the information asymmetry and the so-called agency problem.  
Furthermore, a pillar aiming at providing a permanent education and information channel to 
SMEs could contribute strongly to the holistic approach adopted by the Commission. E-
learning modules may prove very effective in increasing the knowledge and understanding of 
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new or young entrepreneurs about how the (international) business community thinks and 
works. 
On the other hand, a number of actions undertaken under the policy development pillar can be 
considered less relevant, as they did not respond to any specific needs among final 
beneficiaries, while mobilising a considerable amount of resources. These actions include, 
most noticeably, one-off studies and databases.  
The activities carried out by the EIC Network can, in principle, be considered to be relevant 
for SMEs, but the low number of SMEs reached (21%) is a bit disappointing, in particular 
because the reported percentage – based on the number of distributed brochures, leaflets etc. – 
may well overestimate the number of potential clients reached.  The significant discrepancy 
between the reported awareness by EICs themselves (5 out of 6) and by the business 
organisations (3.5 out of 6) seems to confirm this finding.  
Effectiveness: from this standpoint, the results of the Programme are generally satisfactory, 
but there is substantial room for improvement, not only in terms of final scores but also in 
terms of compliance with the stated intention and goals. For example, it was not possible to 
measure the results of the Programme in terms of its impact on employment growth, 
productivity, competitiveness or innovativeness of investments, let alone the rate of return on 
financial resources allocated to the different subsets of the Programme. Concerning the policy 
development pillar, significant drawbacks were caused by some small scale actions and 
databases.  
As regards the problem of SMEs access to finance, loan and micro credit guarantee schemes 
and the ETF Start-Up Facility seem effective on the basis of the reported high leverage ratios. 
However, these ratios do not provide any information about whether the assisted companies 
were indeed unable to raise finance by other means. The ETF Start-Up Facility rule on the 
pari passu position of the EIF in targeted venture capital funds diminished their attractiveness 
for private investors. Moreover, the take-up of other instruments such as the Seed Capital 
Action and the equity guarantee window was slower than expected.  
Finally, the EIC pillar could be rated effective as far as its informative role towards SMEs is 
concerned; the same cannot be said for what concerns EICs’ feedback function to the 
European Commission, as the information made available by the EICs is still substantially 
underexploited at the EU level. 
Efficiency: in terms of cost-effectiveness, the MAP 2001-2005 produced mixed results. The 
lack of a set of well defined and agreed indicators makes it impossible to quantify the results 
in hard numbers (as rate of return on allocated capital). Besides this general problem, as often 
occurs with complex programmes, every pillar includes both efficient projects with well-
managed resources, and actions whose cost greatly exceeded the final output. 
Evaluating the policy development pillar in terms of efficiency is difficult – if not impossible 
– as its expected outputs are of a qualitative nature (promoting entrepreneurship, fostering 
policy changes, etc.) and in most cases should be appraised in the long term. Our judgement is 
slightly positive with the exception of one-off studies and databases that proved to be quite 
expensive and hardly useful, and thus should be discontinued in the future. The evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the financial pillar is also affected by the failure of the JEV programme 
and of the ICT guarantee window, as well as by the slower take-up of the equity guarantee 
window and of the Seed Capital Action. In the latter case, the budget was initially 
overestimated and had to be reallocated: this shows the importance of designing flexible 
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financial instruments that can be adapted overtime to the changing needs of SMEs and to the 
needs of the financial community, while at the same time cutting red tape. 
The EIC network scores better in terms of efficiency as only 12-15% of a centre’s financial 
needs are covered by Community Funding. The informative gains for the European 
Commission are potentially very high, as reported by the responsible unit. However, in order 
to reach more satisfactory results in terms of cost-effectiveness, the Commission should 
ensure a better use and dissemination of the information provided and encoded by the Centres.   
Utility: the contribution of the MAP as a response to the different needs of European SMEs 
varies across the three policy pillars and is, overall, only partially satisfactory. The most 
visible outcomes are the informative and advisory support to SMEs provided by the EICs and 
the funding floating mainly on the back of financial guarantee schemes. It is however, hard to 
identify the actual amount of undisputedly new business generated by EICs and financial 
schemes. On the latter point, more efforts should have been put in stimulating the 
development of early stage/seed capital markets, in order to bridge the valley of death more 
successfully. Changing the pari passu approach of the EIF into the targeted funds may 
eliminate an important bottleneck, as was indicated by interviewed stakeholders.  
These findings are summarised in the table below. 
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Summary of findings – MAP 2001-2005  
PILLAR RELEVANCE EFFECTIVENESS EFFICIENCY UTILITY 
Policy 
development 
Generally high 
- Successful 
coverage of many 
SMEs needs 
- Insufficient 
consideration of e-
learning aspects 
- One-off studies 
and databases not 
responding to 
specific needs of 
final beneficiaries 
Mixed 
- Highly effective 
best projects 
- Ineffective one-off 
studies and 
databases 
- Strong influence of 
the political 
dimension on 
some projects 
- Impact of weak 
indicators strongly 
felt in this pillar 
Mixed  
with some results 
visible only in the 
long term: 
- On average 
projects were 
efficient with an 
acceptable average 
cost  
   Small scale 
measures, one-off 
studies and 
databases 
mobilised 
considerable 
resources without 
reaching many 
final beneficiaries 
Very high  
for best projects 
with clearly defined 
goals 
 
Mixed  
for measures with a 
strong political 
component or with 
weak indicators 
 
Low  
for one-off studies, 
databases and some 
small scale 
measures  
Financial 
instruments 
Mixed  
High for loan and 
good for microcredit  
guarantee schemes 
and ETF-SU facility 
as they addressed 
the need for easier 
access to finance of 
SMEs. 
SMEs financial 
needs in the pre-
seed and expansion 
phase not covered 
The role of 
intermediaries is 
insufficiently 
considered 
Mixed 
High for loan 
guarantee window. 
Satisfactory for 
microcredit 
guarantee window. 
Partially 
disappointing for 
ETF-SU scheme, 
due to pari passu 
approach 
Slow take up of 
equity guarantee 
window and SCA 
Failure of JEV and 
ICT guarantee 
window 
Mixed 
High for  loan and 
microcredit 
guarantee windows 
and ETF-SU scheme 
Flexibility allowed 
efficient reallocation 
of overestimated 
SCA budget 
Slow take up of 
equity guarantee 
window 
Failure of JEV  
Very high  
for successful 
schemes: increased 
access to finance 
and FI taking higher 
risks 
Low for the 
disappointing initial 
performance of SCA 
JEV not yet 
replaced, while 
SMEs international 
cooperation still 
needs to be 
supported 
Need to change the 
EIF pari passu 
approach 
EIC Network 
Very high 
The Network 
responds to 
information needs of 
both SMEs and the 
European 
Commission, 
however the 
percentage of SMEs 
reached could be 
improved 
High  
for informative role 
to SMEs, provision 
of advisory services, 
adequate 
compensation of 
weak centres 
Lower but 
promising for 
feedback function 
due to undergoing 
cultural change 
within the EC 
High 
The EC covers only 
a small portion of 
EICs funding needs 
while informative 
gains are potentially 
very high. A better 
exploitation of the 
feedback function 
would ensure an 
even higher score in 
terms of efficiency 
High  
for the informative 
role towards SMEs. 
Weak centres should 
be reinforced 
Low but promising 
for the feedback 
function as encoded 
information is 
already available 
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Suggestions for the forthcoming CIP (2007-2013) 
The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) will bring together as 
many as nine existing EU initiatives supporting competitiveness, productivity and innovation. 
The CIP will cover the 2007-2013 timeframe and has a budget of € 3,621 billion, approved by 
the European Parliament on June 1, 2006. On an annual basis, this represents a budget 
increase of 60% compared to 2006 under the various equivalent predecessor programmes. It is 
expected that more than 350,000 enterprises will benefit from the new Financial Instruments 
under CIP. The CIP will be implemented through three specific sub-programmes, including 
the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (EIP) that is the direct follow-up of the 
activities carried out under the MAP 2001-2005.  
On the basis of our findings and the recommendations provided by previous studies and 
interviewed stakeholders, we suggest that the following aspects be taken into account to 
ensure that the CIP achieves its ambitious goals: 
 The broad scope of the Programme might diminish the impact and effectiveness of its 
single components/pillars. Thus, focusing on key or overriding objectives, instead of a 
broad array of objectives, is commended for the forthcoming CIP. This should be backed 
by a holistic approach, the use of well articulated strategies and well-designed 
performance indicators. For measuring performance it is of utmost importance to create 
benchmarks right from the outset. Furthermore, the link between overall objectives and 
specific goals should be carefully substantiated by providing clear guidelines for the 
different actions in order to prevent budgetary misallocations. 
 As regards financial instruments, the overriding goal should be closing the equity gap by 
initially tapping new sources of equity funding via the introduction of new financial 
instruments on public markets, and then stimulating the traditional bank channels to also 
access equity finance, by professionalising their credit assessment systems and staff and 
adjusting their prices to public markets levels.       
 Previous experience underlined the importance of correction mechanisms and flexibility 
when ineffective planning, unforeseen market developments or budgetary misallocations 
have to be adjusted. In this respect, frequent and effective internal feedback mechanisms 
and the exchange of best practices at the level of project management should be ensured 
to solve in a timely and effective manner problems arising during the implementation 
phase. 
 The broader scope of the CIP might create further problems in terms of communication 
and dissemination of achieved results. As a consequence, an adequate communication 
strategy, right from the beginning, is also recommended. The possibility of setting up a 
dedicated budget line for this purpose should be considered, together with a greater 
involvement of business associations in the dissemination strategy.  
Moreover, more specific recommendations are: 
 Initiate new direct support projects for the internationalisation of SMEs (for instance 
understanding social and business culture and business risks of foreign markets). 
 Initiate projects to foster trust between money-seeking companies (especially starters and 
small companies), financial actors and intermediaries (accountants and AOs) to stimulate 
a better cooperation in assessing credit risks, building credit histories and future financial 
development. This would increase the availability of finance and facilitate the decision 
making process (slashing overhead costs and time lines).  
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 Initiate projects to stimulate the introduction of new financial instruments to tap new 
sources of equity funding. 
 Initiate an e-learning project to professionalise SMEs in doing business while making 
them more accustomed to the use digital strategies for growing their business.  
 Adequate human and financial resources should be dedicated to the EICs, which have 
proven to be effective and efficient, whereas least performing EICs should be allocated a 
lower share of Community funding. This also implies the setting up of monitoring tools to 
identify best and worst performing EICs. 
 The Commission should ensure that the feedback contribution provided by the EICs  is 
used and fulfils its potential as a tool to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of 
implemented activities.  
 There should be stronger coordination (but not overlap) between the CIP and the RTD 
Framework Programme. 
 Strong coordination with the JEREMIE programme should be ensured to magnify the 
impact of Community intervention on the development of venture capital markets in 
Europe.   
Notes de synthèse 
 
Les petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) ont été définies comme « la colonne vertébrale de 
l’économie européenne », et sont de plus en plus reconnues pour être une source majeure 
d’emploi, d’innovation et d’entreprenariat. Au sein de l’UE 25, 23 millions de PMEs 
représentent 99% des entreprises, fournissent 75 millions d’emplois et contribuent à la 
création de 55% de la richesse. De plus, un tiers des employés et plus de deux-tiers des 
employés dans le secteur privé en Europe travaillent dans des PMEs. Etant donné 
l’importance stratégique des PMEs, la Commission Européenne a initié plusieurs politiques 
visant à promouvoir le développement des PMEs, l’accès au financement et l’investissement 
dans le R&D et l’innovation. 
Un rôle proéminent parmi les programmes de l’UE visant les PMEs est joué par le 
Programme Multi annuel pour les Entreprises et l’Entreprenariat 2001-2005 (MAP), financé 
par le budget Communautaire et par des instruments de cofinancements. Le MAP a été 
prolongé jusqu’à la fin 2006 afin d’assurer une continuité avec le Programme-cadre pour 
l’Innovation et la Compétitivité (CIP), un projet très ambitieux qui sera en application de 
2007 à 2013. C’est dans ce contexte que la Comité budgétaire du Parlement Européen a 
demandé au Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) d’évaluer les résultats du MAP sur la 
période 2000-2005 en termes de pertinence, d’efficacité, d’efficience et d’utilité, en 
soulignant la rentabilité des programmes et de leurs actions. En outre un effort particulier sera 
dédié à l’évaluation de l’allocation des fonds et si l’implémentation a produit les effets 
quantitatifs et qualitatifs attendus. Par ailleurs, CEPS a été chargé de fournir des orientations 
pour les générations futures de programmes, notamment le CIP. En effectuant ces activités, 
nous avons décidé de nous concentrer tout particulièrement sur les actions entreprises entre 
2001 et 2006, puisqu’elles fournissent l’information pertinente et consistante avec les résultats 
de l’initiative MAP et par conséquent contribueront à une meilleure orientation pour le CIP 
imminent. 
Les conclusions de notre évaluation du MAP tout comme l’ensemble de recommandations 
pour le CIP sont résumées ci-dessous. 
 
MAP: structure et budget 
Le budget du MAP 2001-2005 s’élève à 450 millions d’euro. La structure du programme suit 
un logique d’intervention Communautaire spécifique visant à couvrir tous les domaines 
affectant les PMEs européennes. La structure du Programme comporte donc plusieurs niveaux 
allant des objectifs généraux vers les projets individuels. Le Programme est structuré selon 
trois piliers d’intervention qui sont en accord avec les buts généraux du programme. 
 Politique de développement : selon ce pilier, la Commission en étroite collaboration avec 
les Etats membres, analyse et étudie comment améliorer l’environnement global dans 
lequel les entreprises opèrent. Dans ce domaine, une attention particulière est accordée 
aux ‘Best Procedure projects’ qui permettent à la Commission et aux administrations 
nationales de collaborer activement afin de gagner une meilleure compréhension des 
différents problèmes affectant les entreprises, afin d’échanger les méthodes optimales et 
d’influencer les choix politiques pertinents. Pour la période 2001-2003, 11,3% du budget a 
été alloué à ce pilier. 
 Instruments financiers : Ce pilier contient trois schémas (le schéma start-up de la  
‘European Technology Facility’ (ETF), le ‘SME Guarantee Facility’, le ‘Seed Capital 
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Action Facility’ gérés par le Fond Européen d’Investissement (FEI), qui cherchent à 
améliorer l’environnent financier des entreprises , tout particulièrement des PMEs, en 
comblant les failles que les marchés financiers laissent ouvertes, et à aider les PMEs sur 
l’ensemble de leur cycle de vie, de la phase d’amorçage à la phase d’expansion. Un 
quatrième instrument, le programme Joint European Venture (JEV) initialement prévu a 
été abandonné à cause de son manque de succès, et ne devrait donc pas être considéré 
parmi les éléments du pilier financier. Sur la période 2001-2003, 70,3% du budget a été 
alloué à ce pilier. 
 Réseau Euro Info Centres (EICs) : Ces centres ont été institués depuis 1987 afin d’agir en 
tant qu’interface entre les institutions européennes et les acteurs locaux. EICs jouent deux 
rôles fondamentaux : d’un côté, ils informent, conseillent et assistent les PMEs dans tous 
les domaines liés à l’Europe ; d’un autre ils délivrent un feedback à la Commission sur les 
problèmes, les besoins et les intérêts propres aux PMEs. Le réseau EIC se compose 
actuellement de 282 centres dans 44 pays dont 269 dans l’UE 25, l’EEA et les pays 
candidats, de structures associées ainsi que des relais dans des pays tiers qui apportent de 
la valeur ajoutée au réseau. Sur la période 2001-2003, 18,4% du budget a été alloué à ce 
pilier. 
Le tableau suivant illustre la structure du MAP. 
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Résultats du MAP 2001-2005 
Notre évaluation ex-post a démontré que la qualité des résultats du MAP a varié 
considérablement au sein de chaque pilier et entre les piliers. En général, le Programme a 
produit un résultat mitigé, certaines actions étant particulièrement efficaces et utiles pour les 
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PMEs, alors que d’autres présentent une marge significative d’amélioration. Nos conclusions 
reposent sur les critères d’évaluation sélectionnés et sont présentées ci-dessous. 
 
Commentaires généraux 
En général, trois facteurs ont joué un rôle clef dans la performance générale du MAP : a) les 
liens entre les différents niveaux de la structure du Programme ; b) la qualité des indicateurs 
utilisée pour évaluer les projets individuels, et c) la stratégie générale de communication. 
Premièrement dans certains cas le manque de liens clairs entre les buts généraux et les piliers 
spécifiques du Programme a gêné la phase d’implémentation : les problèmes n’ont pas 
toujours été identifiées à temps, tout particulièrement au sein du pilier de la politique de 
développement, ce qui en a empêché la correction. Deuxièmement, les évaluations 
disponibles ont soulignés que les indicateurs sélectionnés pour superviser l’implémentation 
des projets individuels étaient parfois lacunaires et pas clairs. Dans certains cas, ils n’ont pas 
révélé l’état réel de l’implémentation du projet – pour 16 projets portant sur la politique de 
développement évalués dans le rapport final de la Commission, 12 sur 16 indicateurs de 
participations ne contenaient pas d’informations pertinentes – alors que dans d’autres 
situations, ils sont devenus des objectifs en soi, plutôt que des outils de mesure, à cause du 
manque de focus opérationnel du projet. De plus, certains indicateurs n’étaient pas liés à des 
objectifs spécifiques et ne pouvaient donc pas accomplir leur rôle de mesure. 
Finalement, en ce qui concerne la stratégie de communication, une des critiques les plus 
mentionnées au sujet du MAP précédent (1997-2000) était l’absence d’une stratégie de 
communication et de dissémination efficace - au sein tout comme à l’extérieur de la 
Commission. Au sein du MAP 2001-2005, certains progrès ont été faits, tout particulièrement 
eut égard de la communication au sein de la Commission – avec certaines exceptions, telle 
que la sous-exploitation de l’information fournie par les EICs. Cependant, trop souvent les 
bénéficiaires potentiels ne sont pas conscients de l’existence du MAP. En sus du manque de 
visibilité des politiques implémentées et de la diminution des scores d’appréciation 
conséquente parmi les bénéficiaires finaux, ce manque de communication a parfois engendré 
des opportunités perdues. Par conséquent, la totalité du potentiel de ce Programme et les 
externalités positives résultant de sa bonne implémentation ont été sous-exploités. 
 
Commentaires spécifiques 
Pertinence : Les actions entreprises sous le MAP étaient généralement pertinentes, la 
structure du Programme ayant couvert les besoins essentiels des PMEs. 
Cependant, les trois piliers semblent manquer d’une approche holistique envers les PMEs 
pour combler leur besoin de croissance et de survie quotidien. Au sein du triangle des PMEs, 
des financiers et des intermédiaires, le rôle crucial joué par les comptables les Bureaux 
Administratifs (AOs) pour résoudre le déficit de financement n’a pas été suffisamment 
comblé. Ces intermédiaires jouent un rôle-clef dans la résolution du problème de construction 
de l’histoire de crédit et des prévisions de cash flow qui sont si nécessaires, et pourraient jouer 
un rôle important dans le processus d’évaluation du crédit, tout particulièrement pour les 
jeunes petites entreprises et les start-ups. Ces proccessus ont gagné en importance avec 
l’arrivée de Bâle II. L’accord d’une attention particulière aux intermédiaires pourrait 
significativement réduire les coûts généraux (qui sont souvent des goulots d’étranglement 
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prohibitifs dans le domaine du micro crédit et de petits prêts), tout en réduisant 
significativement l’asymétrie d’information et le problème principal-agent. 
De plus, l’existence d’un pilier qui fournirait une éducation permanente et un canal 
d’information aux PMEs contribuerait fortement à l’adoption d’une approche holistique de la 
part de la Commission. Les jeunes entrepreneurs pourraient accroître efficacement leur savoir 
et leur compréhension des modalités de travail et de fonctionnement de la communauté 
internationale par le biais de projets d’E-learning. 
Certaines des actions entreprises dans le cadre du pilier de la politique de développement sont 
moins pertinentes, puisqu’elles ne répondent pas à des besoins spécifiques des PMEs, alors 
qu’elles ont mobilisé un montant considérable de ressources. Ces actions incluent, plus 
particulièrement des études una tantum et des bases de données. 
En principe, les activités menées par le réseau EIC peuvent être considérées comme 
pertinentes pour les PMEs, mais le faible nombre de PMEs atteintes par ces activités (21%) 
est décevant, tout particulier car le pourcentage reporté se réfère au nombre de brochures et 
d’imprimés publicitaires distribués, etc. ce qui pourrait mener à une surestimation du nombre 
de clients potentiels atteints. L’anomalie significative entre le niveau d’information sur les 
EICs reportée par le réseau lui-même (5 sur 6) et par les entreprises (3.5 sur 6) semble 
confirmer cette conclusion. 
 
Efficience : De ce point de vue, les résultats du Programme sont en général satisfaisant, mais 
il existe un marge significative d’amélioration, pas seulement en termes de scores finaux mais 
aussi en termes de conformité avec les intentions et les buts mentionnés. A titre d’exemple, il 
n’a pas été possible de mesurer les résultats du Programme en termes d’impact sur la 
croissance de l’emploi, de productivité, de compétitivité, d’investissements innovants et 
moins encore le taux de rendement des ressources financières allouées aux différents sous 
parties du Programme. En ce qui concerne le pilier de la politique de développement, des 
failles significatives ont été générées par la taille trop restreinte de certaines actions et par les 
coûts élevés d’autres projets tels que les bases de données. 
En ce qui concerne le problème de l’accès au financement des PMEs, des schémas de garantie 
pour des prêts et des micro crédits ainsi que le schéma ‘ETF Start-up’ semblent effectifs si 
l’on se réfère aux ratios de leviers élevés reportés. Cependant, ces ratios ne révèlent pas si les 
entreprises assistées étaient réellement incapables de trouver des moyens de financement 
alternatifs. La réglementation des modalités de participation du FEI établit une approche pari 
passu au sein du schéma ETF Start-Up ce qui a diminué l’attractivité des fonds de capital-
risque pour les investisseurs privés. Par ailleurs, le démarrage d’autres instruments comme la 
‘Seed Capital Action’ et le ‘ICT’ et la ‘Equity Guarantee Windows’ était plus lent qu’attendu. 
Finalement, la fonction du pilier EIC envers les PMEs pourrait être évaluée effectivement tant 
que son rôle informatif est concerné; la même chose ne peut pas être affirmé en ce qui 
concerne la fonction de feedback du réseau vis-à-vis de la Commission, l’information fournie 
par les EICs étant substantiellement sous-exploitée au niveau de l’UE. 
 
Efficacité : En termes d’efficacité-coût, le MAP 2001-2005 a produit des résultats mitigés. Le 
manque d’un ensemble d’indicateurs bien définis rend la quantification des résultats chiffrés 
impossible (en tant que rendement du capital alloué). Mis à part ce problème général, comme 
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c’est souvent le cas pour des programmes complexes, chaque pilier inclut des projets efficaces 
où les ressources ont été bien gérées, et des actions dont le coût excède largement le résultat. 
L’évaluation en termes d’efficacité du pilier de politique de développement est difficile, voir 
même impossible, les résultats attendus étant d’une nature purement qualitative (promouvoir 
l’entreprenariat, stimuler la modification de politiques, etc.) et dans la majorité des cas ils 
devraient être estimer sur le long terme. Notre jugement est positif avec certaines réservations, 
sauf pour les études una tantum et les bases de données qui sont onéreuses et peu utiles ; elles 
devraient donc être abandonnées dans le futur. L’évaluation de l’efficacité du pilier financier 
est aussi affectée par la défaillance du programme JEV et du ‘ICT Guarantee Window’, tout 
comme par la lenteur du démarrage du ‘Equity Guarantee Window’ et du ‘Seed Capital 
Action’. Le budget du dernier schéma a été initialement surestimé et a du être réalloué : ceci 
souligne l’importance de la construction d’instruments financiers flexibles qui peuvent être 
adaptés au fur et à mesure du temps aux besoins variables des PMEs et aux besoins de la 
communauté financière, tout en réduisant les formalités administratives. 
Le réseau EIC a obtenu des meilleurs scores en termes d’efficacité puisque seulement 12-15% 
des besoins financiers des centres sont couverts par le financement Communautaire. Les gains 
informatifs pour la Commission Européenne sont potentiellement très élevés, comme le 
signale l’unité responsable. Cependant, afin d’atteindre des résultats plus satisfaisants en 
termes d’efficacité-coût, la Commission devrait assurer une meilleure utilisation et 
dissémination de l’information fournie et encodée par les centres. 
 
Utilité : La réponse du MAP aux besoins différents des PMEs européennes varie entre les 
trois piliers et est en général seulement partiellement satisfaisante. Les résultats les plus 
visibles sont le soutien informatif et de conseil fournis aux PMEs par les EICs et l’apport des 
schémas de financement garantis. Cependant, il est difficile d’identifier la quantité réelle de 
nouvelles opportunités économiques générées par les EICs et les schémas financiers. Sur ce 
dernier point, plus d’efforts auraient dû être accordés pour stimuler le développement de 
marchés des capitaux d’amorçage, afin d’aider les PMEs à subvenir avec plus succès à ‘la 
vallée de la mort’. La modification de l’approche pari passu du EIF dans des fonds ciblés 
pourrait réduire le nombre de goulots d’étranglement, comme indiqué par les intéressés 
interviewés. 
Nos conclusions sont résumées dans le tableau ci-dessous. 
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Principaux résultats de l’évaluation – MAP 2001-2005 
PILIER PERTINENCE EFFICIENCE EFFICACITE UTILITE 
Politique de 
développement 
Généralement élevée 
- MAP couvre de 
nombreux besoins des 
PME 
- Considération 
insuffisante des 
aspects liés à l’e-
Learning 
- Les études una tantum  
et les bases de 
données ne répondent 
à aucun besoin 
spécifique des PMEs 
Mitigée 
- ‘best projects’ très 
efficaces 
- Inefficacité des études 
una tantum et des 
bases de données 
- Influence considérable 
de facteurs politiques 
sur la réussite de 
certains projets 
- Forte incidence de la 
faiblesse des 
indicateurs sur ce 
pilier d’intervention 
Mitigée 
Avec certains résultats 
visibles seulement sur le 
long-terme: 
- En moyenne les 
projets ont été 
efficaces et ont un 
coût moyen 
acceptable 
- La taille trop restreinte 
de certaines actions, 
les études una tantum 
et les bases de 
données ont mobilisé 
beaucoup de 
ressources sans 
produire un impact 
significatif  sur les 
PMEs. 
Très élevée 
Pour les ‘best projects’ 
avec des objectifs 
clairement définis 
 
Mitigée 
Pour les actions avec 
une forte composante 
politique ou des 
indicateurs faibles 
 
Basse 
Pour les études una 
tantum, les bases de 
données et la taille trop 
restreinte de certaines 
actions 
Instruments 
financiers 
Mitigée 
Elevée pour les schémas 
de garantie pour les 
prêts et bonne pour les 
schémas de garantie 
pour le microcrédit et le 
schéma ETF-SU: ces 
instruments répondent 
au besoin d’une 
facilitation de l’accès au 
financement pour les 
PME. 
Les besoins financiers 
des PME en termes de 
capital d’amorçage et 
d’expansion ne sont pas 
couverts 
Le rôle des 
intermédiaires 
financiers n’est pas 
suffisamment considéré 
Mitigée 
Elevée pour le schéma 
de garantie pour les 
prêts. 
Satisfaisante pour le 
schéma de garantie pour 
le microcrédit. 
Partiellement décevante 
pour le schéma ETF-SU 
à cause de la règle pari 
passu 
Démarrage lent du 
schéma equity garantie 
et de la SCA 
Faillite du JEV et du 
schéma de garantie ICT 
Mitigée 
Elevée pour les schéma 
de garantie pour les 
prêts et le micro-crédit 
et le schéma ETF-SU 
Une approche flexible a 
permit la redistribution 
efficiente du budget 
initialement surestimé et 
destiné au schéma SCA 
Démarrage lent du 
schéma equity 
guarantee 
Faillite du JEV 
Très élevée 
Schémas à succès: 
l’accès au financement a 
cru pour les PME et le 
intermédiaires 
Financiers ont pris plus 
de risques. 
Basse 
A cause de la 
performance initiale 
plutôt décevante du 
SCA 
La JEV n’a pas encore 
été remplacée alors que 
la coopération 
internationale entre 
PME a toujours besoin 
de support 
Nécessité de changer 
l’approche pari passu 
du EIF 
Réseau EIC 
Très élevée 
Le Réseau répond aux 
besoins d’informations 
des PME et de la 
Commission 
Européenne. Le 
pourcentage de PME 
bénéficiant du Réseau 
pourrait être amélioré 
Elevée 
Pour fournir de 
l’information et des 
conseils aux PME. Le 
Réseau compense 
adéquatement les 
centres faibles 
Plus basse mais 
prometteuse en ce qui 
concerne le rôle de 
feedback du Réseau, 
grâce au changement de 
culture en cours au sein 
de la Commission 
Européenne 
Elevée 
La Commission couvre 
seulement une partie 
minimale des besoins de 
financement du Réseau, 
alors que les gains en 
terme d’information 
sont potentiellement très 
élevés. Une meilleure 
exploitation de la 
fonction de feedback 
accroîtrait les résultats 
du réseau en termes 
d’efficience 
Elevée 
Pour le rôle 
d’information envers les 
PME. 
Les centres faibles 
devraient être renforcés. 
Basse  en ce qui 
concerne le rôle de 
feedback du Réseau, car 
certaines informations 
sont déjà codifiées et 
disponibles au sein des 
services de la 
Commission 
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Suggestions pour le CIP (2007-2013) 
Le Programme-cadre pour l’Innovation et la Compétitivité (CIP) réunira neuf initiatives 
existantes au niveau européen, qui soutiennent la compétitivité, la productivité et l’innovation. 
Le CIP couvrira la période 2007-2013 et aura un budget de € 3,621 billion, budget qui a été 
approuvé par le Parlement Européen le 1 Juin 2006. Sur une base annuelle, ceci représente un 
accroissement du budget de 60%, en comparaison avec la contribution financière destinée aux 
programmes équivalents en 2006. On estime que plus de 350,000 entreprises vont bénéficier 
des nouveaux instruments financiers sous le CIP. Le Programme sera mis en place grâce à 
trois sous-programmes spécifiques, comprenant entre autres le sous-programme pour 
l’Innovation et l’Esprit d’Entreprise (EIP) qui est le successeur direct des activités couvertes 
par le MAP 2001-2005.  
Sur la base de nos conclusions et des recommandations fournies par des études antérieures et 
par les intéressés au cours d’interviews, nous suggérons de prendre en considérations les 
aspects suivants, afin de garantir que CIP atteigne ses objectifs ambitieux: 
 
 La large ampleur du Programme pourrait diminuer l’impact et l’efficacité de ses 
composantes. Il est donc impératif pour le CIP de se concentrer sur des objectif-clefs et 
non sur un ensemble de buts trop large. De plus, cette intention devrait être accompagnée 
d’une approche holistique, de stratégies bien articulées et d’indicateurs de performance 
bien construits. Afin de véritablement mesurer les performances, la création de 
benchmarks dès le début du Programme est fondamentale. En outre, le lien entre les 
objectifs globaux du programme et ses buts spécifiques doit être attentivement coordonné 
en fournissant des indications claires pour chaque action, dans le but d’éviter des 
allocations erronées du budget.  
 En ce qui concerne les instruments financiers, le but principal est de fermer ‘l’equity gap’ 
en captant de nouvelles sources de financement par actions, en introduisant de nouveaux 
instruments financiers sur les marchés publics, ainsi qu’en incitant les intermédiaires du 
secteur bancaire à les financer, en professionnalisant leurs systèmes d’évaluation du 
crédit, leurs ressources humaines ainsi qu’en ajustant leur prix au niveau de ceux du 
marché public.     
 L’expérience passée souligne l’importance des mécanismes de correction et de la 
flexibilité quand aux besoins d’ajuster une planification inefficace, des développements 
imprévus du marché ou une mauvaise allocation du budget se présente. Par conséquent, 
des systèmes de feedback internes fréquents et effectifs et l’échange de ‘best practices’ au 
niveau de la gestion des projets doivent être assurés pour pouvoir résoudre à temps et 
avec efficacité les problèmes qui surgissent lors de l’implémentation du Programme.  
 L’ampleur plus large du CIP pourrait créer de nouveaux problèmes en termes de 
communication et de dissémination des résultats obtenus. Une stratégie de communication 
adéquate est donc recommandée. La possibilité d’envisager une ligne budgétaire 
spécifique à la communication devrait être prise en considération, ainsi qu’une 
participation majeure des représentants des entreprises dans la stratégie de 
dissémination. 
Par ailleurs, nos recommandations plus spécifiques sont les suivantes: 
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 Lancer un nouveau projet de support direct pour l’internationalisation des PMEs (afin de 
leur permettre de comprendre la culture et les risques de gestion propres aux marchés 
étrangers) 
 Lancer des projets pour améliorer la confiance entre les entreprises en besoin de 
financement (start-up et petites entreprises), acteurs financiers et intermédiaires 
(comptables et AOs) afin de stimuler une meilleur coopération en évaluant les risques de 
crédit, en établissant les historiques de crédit et les développements financiers futurs afin 
d’accroître la disponibilité financière et de facilité le processus décisionnel (réduire les 
coûts généraux et l’attente). 
 Lancer des projets pour stimuler l’introduction de nouveaux instruments financiers pour 
apporter des nouvelles sources de financement à l’aide d’actions. 
 Lancer un projet sur d’E-learning pour professionnaliser les PMEs dans leur activité 
entreprenariale tout en les familiarisant à l’utilisation de solutions digitales pour le 
croissance de leur entreprise. 
 Des ressources humaines et financières adéquates doivent être allouées aux EICs qui se 
sont avérées efficaces et efficientes. Au contraire les EICs les moins performants 
devraient percevoir une plus faible part de financement Communautaire. Ceci implique 
aussi la création d’outils de contrôle pour identifier les centres qui performent et ceux qui 
ne performent pas. 
 La Commission devrait garantir que le feedback fourni par les EICs soit utilisé et 
remplisse son potentiel en tant qu’outil de contrôle de l’efficacité et de l’efficience des 
activités implémentées. 
 Il devrait y avoir une coordination plus intense (sans juxtapositions) entre le CIP et le 
Programme cadre RTD. 
 Une coordination plus intense avec le programme JEREMIE devrait être garanti pour 
amplifier l’impact de l’intervention Communautaire sur le développement des marchés 
pour le capital risque en Europe. 
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1 Introduction 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have been defined as the “backbone of the 
European economy”, and are increasingly recognised as a major source of entrepreneurial 
skills, employment and innovation.1 In the EU25, some 23 million SMEs represent 99% of all 
enterprises, provide 75 million jobs and make a 55% contribution towards the creation of 
wealth: in addition, one third of employees and over two thirds of private-sector employees in 
Europe work in SMEs. Given their outstanding strategic importance, the European 
Commission has launched several policies to promote the development of SMEs in a number 
of policy fields, from access to finance to support for investment in R&D and innovation, 
from policy development initiatives to more direct financial instruments aimed at improving 
the business environment in which enterprises operate. Many of these policy interventions 
build on the European Charter for Small Enterprises, a key instrument of political 
encouragement and follow-up2. At a more operational level, the most important and 
comprehensive initiative undertaken in the past few years is the Multi-Annual Programme for 
Enterprises and Entrepreneurship (MAP), extended until the end of 2006 to pave the way for 
an even more ambitious programme, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme (CIP), which will run from 2007 to 2013.  
Against this backdrop, the Budgetary Committee of the European Parliament requested the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) to analyse the output of the MAP over the period 
2000-2005 and the prospects for the CIP programme 2007-2013 in the area of SMEs financed 
by the Community budget as well as through co-financing instruments. This study illustrates 
the main findings of the analysis undertaken, and aims at: a) highlighting the “value for 
money” of the programmes and related actions; b) assessing whether the funds dedicated to 
their implementation have produced the expected quantitative and qualitative effects; and c) 
giving orientations for the new generation of programmes beyond 2006 (CIP) based on the 
evaluation of the ones terminating, with an emphasis on the impact of budget instruments on 
the development of SMEs and the need for simplification and rationalisation of Community 
                                                 
1 According to the latest definition, valid from 1 January 2005, SMEs are enterprises, which alone or with other 
partners employ fewer than 250 persons and which have an annual turnover not exceeding €50 million and/or an 
annual balance sheet total not exceeding €43 million (27 million in the previous definition, dated 1996). The 
definition covers any legal entity engaged in economic activity, irrespective of its form – therefore, also self-
employed entrepreneurs, single member companies, family firms, unlimited or limited partnerships, non-profit 
distributing, associations regularly engaged in economic activities, etc. See European Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC of 6 May 2003, concerning the definition of SME, OJ L 124, 20/05/2003, p. 36.  
2 For further details, see: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/charter/index_en.htm.  
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instruments, improvement of the business environment, innovation, policy analysis, 
development and coordination of SMEs.  
This ex post evaluation was carried out on the basis of four main dimensions, namely: 
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and utility. We define these dimensions as follows: 
• The relevance dimension measures the extent to which the objectives of public 
intervention proved appropriate with respect to the funds available, the needs perceived 
and the specific problems the intervention was meant to solve. 
• The effectiveness dimension is the extent to which the effects of a given programme have 
contributed to the achievement of the specific objectives of the intervention.  
• The efficiency dimension is to be interpreted as “cost-effectiveness”, i.e. how 
economically have the various inputs been converted into outputs and results; and whether 
the (expected) effects have been obtained at a reasonable cost. 
• Finally, accounting for the utility dimension means assessing whether the impacts 
achieved by an intervention correspond to the needs and problems identified at the outset. 
The remaining part of this study is structured in three main parts: section 2 presents the 
structure, the goals and the expected results of MAP and related actions. Section 3 provides an 
evaluation of the MAP and of its main components. Section 4 provides a preliminary 
assessment of the main changes introduced in the CIP and some suggestions for future 
programmes.  
Note on methodology 
This evaluation has been carried out during the period July-August 2006 with the help of desk 
work, expert consultation, and interviews of relevant stakeholders representing both European 
institutions and the business community. Information was primarily collected through desk 
work and on the basis of available documents, reports, studies, publications and evaluations of 
the targeted programmes by the European Commission and external evaluators. Interviews 
with relevant stakeholders were carried out to update available data and to gather view on the 
MAP and relevant suggestions for the forthcoming CIP. We seize this occasion to thank all 
the interviewees and contacted persons that provided the Centre for European Policy Studies 
with helpful information and contributed with their time and knowledge to this report.  
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2 General overview of the MAP 2001-2005 
The Multi-Annual Programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship and in particular for small 
and medium-sized enterprises 2001-2005 (MAP)3 is the follow-up of a similar Community 
initiative running from 1997 to 2000.4 The MAP was launched by the European Commission 
in co-operation with EU member states, candidate and EFTA/EEA countries to promote and 
support productive entrepreneurial activity in Europe and improve the business environment 
in which enterprises operate. The Programme has been extended until the end of 2006 to 
create a bridge with the forthcoming Competitiveness and Innovation framework Programme 
2007-2013 (CIP).  
The structure of the MAP 2001-2005 follows a specific Community intervention logic aiming 
at addressing all the various areas that affect European SMEs and is thus articulated in a set of 
levels stemming from general objectives to single projects.5  
The Programme is articulated along five general objectives6: 
1. To enhance the growth and competitiveness of business; 
2. To promote entrepreneurship; 
3. To simplify and improve the administrative and regulatory framework for business; 
4. To improve the financial environment for SMEs; 
5. To give business easier access to Community support services, programmes and networks. 
In addition to these objectives, it is worth recalling that MAP is also an instrument conceived 
to foster the implementation of the ten Action Lines of the European Charter for Small 
Enterprises.7 
The five objectives, in turn, can be grouped into three different pillars/instruments that set the 
foundations of the operational part of the Programme. The three pillars constitute what could 
be defined as the “intermediate” level of MAP, whose role is to provide specific orientation 
for subsequent activities and to refine the five general goals mentioned above. More in detail, 
the first three general objectives compose the “policy development” pillar; the fourth 
objective constitutes the “financial” pillar of the Programme; and the fifth general objective is 
pursued through the “Euro Info Centres Network”. These three pillars of the intermediate 
level of the Programme are described below. 
                                                 
3 Council Decision (2000/819/EC) of 20 December 2000 and amended by the Decision (1776/2005/EC) of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on a multi-annual programme for enterprise and 
entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (2001-2006). 
4 The 3rd Multiannual Programme for SMEs in the European Union (1997-2000), adopted with Council Decision 
of 9 December 1996, 97/15/EC, OJ L6, 10/01/1997, p. 25-31. For further details, see European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Report on the evaluation of the 3rd Multiannual Programme for 
SMEs in the European Union (1997-2000), COM (99) 319. 
5 For further details, see European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General, Multi-annual Programme for 
enterprise and entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises (2001-2005) – MAP, 
Intermediate Evaluation, Final Report, 2003, (hereinafter Intermediate Evaluation), p. 14. 
6 These objectives are outlined in Council Decision 2000/819/EC and its Annex I, establishing the Programme 
and clarifying its goals.  
7 See the Action Lines at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/charter/index_en.htm.  
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• The policy development pillar: the Commission, in close coordination with Member 
States, analyses and studies how to improve the overall environment in which enterprises 
operate. Within this field, particular attention is paid to the Best Procedure 
projects, whereby the Commission and national administrations actively collaborate to 
gain a better understanding of the various issues of concern to businesses, exchange best 
practices and influence relevant policy choices. 
• The financial pillar contains schemes, managed by the European Investment Fund, that 
are specifically targeted at improving the financial environment for businesses, especially 
SMEs, by bridging those gaps that financial markets would otherwise normally leave 
open. These are perceived gaps that strongly suggest market failures. This pillar can be 
further broken down in three main facilities:  
o the start-up scheme of the European Technology Facility (ETF), which supports 
the establishment and financing of SMEs in their start-up phase by investing in 
relevant specialised venture capital funds and by supporting the establishment and 
development of business incubators; 
o the SME Guarantee Facility, designed to facilitate (and increase the availability 
of) access to debt finance for small companies with job creation potential in 
Europe; 
o the Seed Capital Action Facility, designed to stimulate the supply of capital for the 
creation of innovative new businesses with growth and employment creation 
potential, through support (e.g., long-term recruitment of additional investment 
managers) for seed funds, incubators or similar organisations. 
In addition, a fourth financial instrument was originally envisaged, the Joint European 
Venture (JEV) Programme, with the aim of promoting trans-national cooperation between 
European enterprises. Such instrument, however, is now being phased out due to lack of 
success, and is thus not to be included in the components of the financial pillar. 
• The Euro Info Centres represent an interface between European institutions and local 
actors. Their task is to inform, advise and assist SMEs in all Europe-related areas while 
taking into account the great variety of enterprises concerned, so that, either directly or 
indirectly, they can make matters simpler and more efficient for SMEs. They also provide 
feedback to the Commission on SME concerns, needs and interests. Finally, EICs foster 
business cooperation between European SMEs. 
The lower layer of the MAP architecture is constituted by the operational part of the 
Programme, i.e. the single projects that can be traced back to one of the three pillars. This is 
where the expected outputs of the projects should become visible. For the sake of clarity and 
on the basis of the MAP actions implemented so far, we further divide this operational layer 
in two parts. The first, which is more generic, is composed by macro groups/clusters of 
projects/sub-programmes such a the “Best Procedure” projects or one of the financial schemes 
mentioned above; whereas the second part is composed by the single actions or by initiatives 
that are not related to any general category/sub-programme. 
The structure of the Programme is presented in figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1 – Structure of the MAP 2001-2005 
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In particular, the policy development and financial pillars are conceived to follow the 
lifecycle of a SME from its very early (seed) phase – mostly through risk capital instruments 
– to its growth and expansion stage – with extensive use of debt financing and guarantee 
schemes. Figure 2 illustrates the combination of instruments conceived at EU level to support 
SMEs in the different phases of their life.8 As can be already observed, no ad hoc initiative 
was undertaken to involve business angels and formal early stage and venture capital funds at 
an earlier stage of the life cycle, more specifically to co-invest together with the entrepreneur 
in the seed phase.   
 
Figure 2 – Policy development and financial instruments 
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8 See Hudina and Budavari (DG Enterprise), Screening Financial Instruments, presentation at the meeting with 
Croation and Turkish representatives, 26 March 2006. 
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Within the MAP, there are also residual projects that do not fall under any of the previous 
pillars and that the Commission itself classifies as “other actions”. As these projects normally 
contribute to policy development goals, they should be considered as an additional 
contribution to the specific projects belonging to the first pillar. 
2.1 Budget and management of the MAP 2001-2005 
The MAP 2001-2005 budget amounts to around 450 million Euros, which cannot be 
considered as a very large amount if compared with the ambitious goals of the Programme 
and the huge number of SMEs operating in Europe.  According to figures provided by annual 
implementation reports and by an external evaluation of the Programme, the percentage 
distribution of the budget between the three pillars during the 2001-2003 timeframe was 
unevenly divided among the three pillars, with the financial instruments getting the lion’s 
share of the funding (70,3%).9 Figure 3 illustrates the allocation of budget in the 2001-2003 
period.  
 
Figure 3 – MAP: Budget Allocated to each pillar, 2001-2003 
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The MAP is managed by the European Commission with the assistance of the Enterprise 
Programme Management Committee (EPMC), composed by the representative of the 
authorities of participating countries. As EFTA/EEA and Candidate Countries participate in 
the activities of the Programme, their representatives take part in the Committees meetings as 
observers. In addition, the Enterprise Policy Group (EPG) examines general enterprise policy 
issues and is in charge of identifying and disseminating good practices. 
MAP activities are planned on an annual basis and are generally linked to one of the three 
pillars mentioned above. Planned activities are normally described in dedicated “fiches”, 
stating the objectives and the main evaluation indicators of each project. 
                                                 
9 For further details see INFYDE S.L./Lacave Allemand & Asssociés, External evaluation of the Multiannual 
Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) 2001-2005, final report, September 2004, p. 18. 
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2.2 Indicators 
Indicators play a fundamental role in the MAP, as they constitute one of the main tools to 
assess if the actions carried out contribute to the achievement of the overarching goals of the 
Programme. Moreover, they allow the monitoring of the level of implementation of each 
project and provide the necessary information to carry out interim and ex-post evaluations of 
the planned activities. Each intervention level has its own indicators, generally belonging to 
one of the following types:  
• participation,  
• deliverables (both in quantitative and qualitative terms),  
• implementation, and  
• effectiveness.  
Such types are then further broken down in operational measurement instruments, according 
to the needs of specific projects. 
A more in-depth analysis of the specific objectives and of the expected outputs of each pillar 
of intervention is presented below. 
 
2.3 The three pillars in detail 
2.3.1 Policy Development 
As anticipated in the general introduction, this pillar groups all the projects aimed at 
enhancing growth and competitiveness of European enterprises, promoting entrepreneurship 
and simplifying and improving the administrative and regulatory environment in which SMEs 
operate. Activities under this heading are quite diversified and range from the assessment of 
administrative burdens in a particular sector to facilitating the transfer of businesses and 
promoting entrepreneurship in general. 
Given that the underlying goal of the policy development pillar is to influence and improve 
enterprise and SMEs policies across Europe, planned projects generally target national 
administration officials and policy-makers, experts, EC projects managers and, to a lesser 
extent, business organisations and SMEs representatives. As a consequence, final 
beneficiaries – i.e. SMEs – benefit only indirectly from the initiatives carried out under this 
heading.   
A comprehensive and detailed list of the projects implemented is provided by the MAP 2001-
2005 implementation report. Such variety of actions and expected outputs mirrors the broad 
scope of the policy development heading. Most common initiatives undertaken include: 
 The production of ad hoc studies and reports. This happens mostly in the field of 
administrative and regulatory burdens affecting enterprises. Some examples are a 
publication on obstacles to growth and the recruitment of the first employee, a study on 
alternative dispute resolution systems between businesses, or a study on self and co-
regulatory practices. 
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 The organisation of meetings and conferences on selected topics, such as e-business, legal 
barriers for businesses, intellectual property issues, with the aim of raising awareness 
among relevant stakeholders on the most pressing concerns of European SMEs. 
 Activities to promote entrepreneurship normally consist in the exchange of best practices 
and the organisation of workshops targeting special categories such as secondary school 
students, minorities, women entrepreneurs. Specific aspects of entrepreneurial activity 
such as tourist practices, corporate social responsibility and social entrepreneurship are 
also addressed. 
 In some cases, more complex initiatives involving greater human and financial resources – 
such as the creation and maintenance of databases on business services, on business 
demography statistics – have been carried out. 
 Finally, the so-called Best Procedure Projects deserve a special mention. Based on the 
Open Method of Coordination, the Best Procedure sets a framework for the exchange of 
best practices among member states in selected areas representing political priorities for 
enterprises, as agreed between national policymakers and the business community. 
Priorities are generally discussed within the Enterprise Policy Group.  
The majority of activities carried out under the policy development pillar as well as projects 
implementing the Charter for Small Enterprises fall into the Best Procedure projects 
category.10 To achieve greater visibility, these projects are often linked to various initiatives 
undertaken by the country holding the Presidency of the European Union.   
The main goals and expected outputs of the policy development pillar are summarised in the 
table below.  
 
                                                 
10 A complete list of the Best Projects carried out during the implementation of MAP 2001-2005 is available on 
the website of the Directorate General for Enterprise and Industry at the following link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/enterprise_policy/best/best_procedure.htm 
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Table 1  
Goals, project typology and outputs of the policy development pillar 
General goals falling under the 
pillar 
Type of project/action Expected outputs 
1. Enhancing growth and 
competitiveness of business in a 
knowledge-based international 
economy 
• Benchmarking 
• Exchange of best practices  
• Awareness raising events 
• Service contracts  
• Surveys and data collection 
• Studies 
• Reports 
• Conference and related publications 
• Workshops 
• Databases and related publications 
2. Promoting entrepreneurship • Establishment of expert groups  
• Exchange of best practices  
• Studies  
• Impact Assessment 
• Data collection 
• Conferences and reports 
• Handbooks and self-evaluation 
tools for entrepreneurs 
• Courses for selected audiences 
• Dissemination of data 
 
3. Simplifying and improving the 
administrative and regulatory 
framework for business, in 
particular to promote research, 
innovation and business creation 
• Studies and methodology 
production 
• Consultations 
• Programmes to promote better 
regulation culture  
• Data collection 
• Publications and studies 
• Conferences for public 
administration, universities, etc. 
 
2.3.2 Financial instruments 
The three MAP financial instruments (ETF Start-up scheme, SME Guarantee Facility, Seed 
Capital Action) became fully operational in 2002. They are managed via a three-tiered system 
involving DG Enterprise, DG Economic and Financial Affairs and the European Investment 
Fund with the first two actors setting the programmatic priorities of the pillar, while the EIF 
manages the single financial facilities. An initial indicative budget of approximately EUR 319 
million for the period 2001-2005 was proposed for the financial instruments managed by the 
EIF. The budget for this pillar should be exhausted at the end of 2006, due to the extension of 
the MAP.  
As anticipated in the general overview of the MAP, a fourth instrument - the Joint European 
Venture programme (JEV) - is being phased out since December 2004, after a joint decision 
of the European Parliament and the Council.11 Directly managed by the European 
Commission, the JEV was aimed at fostering the trans-national cooperation of European 
SMEs by financing the creation of joint ventures between enterprises from different member 
states operating in the same sector. In the attempt to avoid duplications in the allocation of 
funding because of potential overlapping with other Community programmes, JEV 
application procedures were conceived as extremely complex and ultimately were one of the 
main reasons of the programme’s failure.12  
                                                 
11 Decision 593/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 July 2004. 
12 According to the European Commission, 323 applications were received by the end of 2005, 230 agreements 
were signed, with a total allocation of 19.8 million Euros. Given the high number of potential applicants to this 
programme, these results are quite disappointing. 
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According to Commission sources, 71 projects were approved by the end of 2005 under the 
financial pillar and only 8 were cancelled when applicants proved unable to raise the 
necessary private funding or could not fulfil their tasks. The budget for the remaining 63 
projects amounts to approximately EUR 319 million, and was allocated as follows. 
 
Table 2  
Projects approved and budget allocation for the financial pillar 
Facility Approvals Cancellations Net approvals Signatures 
 No Amount 
EUR m 
No Amount 
EUR m 
No Amount 
EUR m 
No Amount 
EUR m 
ETF Start-up 
scheme 12 105.1 2 13.3 10 91.8 9 67.7 
SME Guarantee 
Facility 48 226.0 0 0 48 226.0 45 117.0 
Seed Capital Action 11 2.0 6 1.2 5 0.8 2 0.3 
Total 71 333.1 8 14.5 63 318.6 56 245.0 
Source: European Commission, Implementation Report, March 2006, p.41 
 
As emerges from Table 2, the SME Guarantee Facility (SMEG) is undoubtedly the largest of 
the financial instruments (around 71% of the budget of the second pillar) and was expected to 
exert a large quantitative impact on final beneficiaries. According to an external evaluation of 
the MAP, this instrument reached approximately 178,000 beneficiaries, of which about 
166,000 SMEs, over a period of 4-5 years covered by the MAP and its predecessor, the 
Growth and Employment Initiative, which ran from 1998 to 2000. These figures continued to 
improve over time, with 192,000 SMEs beneficiaries in 2005.13 
The SMEG is divided in four windows:  
 the loan guarantee window; 
 the micro-credit window; 
 the equity guarantee window, and  
 the ICT window.  
Of these, the ICT window has almost never been used, as many projects potentially falling 
into its scope have been financed by the general loan window instead. To the contrary, the 
loan guarantee window is the most important in terms of resources allocated and number of 
financial beneficiaries. The micro-credit window, which provides for a “social inclusion” 
component directed at disadvantaged groups was less used. Finally, the full potential of the 
equity guarantee window has not been unleashed yet, as the take-up of this scheme was 
slower than expected. 
                                                 
13 For further details, see European Commission, From the MAP to the CIP Programme, presentation by Jean-
Noël DURVY at the SME Guarantee Facility Conference, Luxembourg, 28 April 2005. 
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The second facility in terms of allocated resources is the ETF-SU scheme, accounting for 
approximately 29% of the pillar’s budget. This scheme addresses the market gap for early 
stage venture capital funds and aims at increasing the amount of funds invested in start-ups 
across Europe. In some members states it is also meant to remedy to the weakness or absence 
of the venture capital market. At the end of 2005, the EIF had signed 21 deals under this 
facility. The criteria for the attribution of funding are purely market-based, in order to avoid 
potential distortions. 
The Seed Capital Action has played only a minor role so far, due to the implosion of the 
internet bubble and to the general market downturn observed since the launching of this 
facility. Accordingly, only 2 deals were signed so far (see table above) and a few others are in 
the pipeline for the coming years.  
Besides the projects funded by the facilities presented above, other actions have been carried 
out under the financial instruments pillar. These initiatives include the organisation of 
workshops and events for experts and representatives of the financial sector and SMEs to 
raise the awareness of relevant stakeholders on the problems of access to finance for SMEs. 
Another project foresees the provision of technical assistance to financial institutions and 
bodies providing guarantees to SMEs. These activities, which could also be considered as 
“policy development” projects, aim at ensuring that the goals and the benefits of the three 
financial facilities are understood and widespread across the EU. 
 
2.3.3 The Euro Info Centres Network 
Set up in 1987, the EuroInfoCentres (EIC) network aims to bridge the gap between the 
European and the local level by providing relevant assistance and information on EU related 
topics to SMEs and feedback on businesses’ needs to the European Commission. Another 
function performed by EICs is to foster business cooperation between SMEs across Europe. 
This latter aspect is less relevant to the implementation of the MAP initiative, and thus will 
not be examined in detail in this study.   
The EIC network currently consists in 282 points in 44 countries with 269 centres in the 
EU25, the EEA and candidate countries and other associated structures and relay points in 
third countries bringing added value to the network.14 The network existed well before and 
independently of the MAP, and has only later become the third pillar of the Programme: since 
then, EICs have been allocated the task to give businesses easier access to Community 
support services, programmes and networks and to improve the coordination of these 
facilities. Moreover, the MAP itself contributed to the maintenance of the network and to its 
growth both in terms of size and quality.  
EICs are normally based in a host structure, i.e. public or private organisations such as 
chambers of commerce, professional federations, national or regional institutions. Host 
structures are selected on the basis of their comprehensive knowledge of the local economic 
environment, and generally sustain the majority of the financing of each EIC point. As a 
consequence, the direct EC contribution to this pillar could be very limited. It covers on 
average between 12% and 15% of the total budget of each centre.15  
                                                 
14 Data for 2004, as provided in the latest Annual Report 2004 published by the Euro Info Centre Network.  
15 As previously mentioned, the EU financing for the EIC pillar amounts to 18.4 % of the MAP budget. More 
specifically, in 2002 the EC contribution to EIC in the EU15 covered only 12% of the total EIC budget.  
12 | A. RENDA, L. SCHREFLER AND F. VON DEWALL  
 
The EIC Network employs about 1,600 people and organises training and exchanges of best 
practices for its staff in order to update competences and ensure the quality of the service. In 
addition to this, an advanced intranet system connects all existing centres to facilitate the 
exchange of relevant information and the creation of feedback mechanisms to improve the 
quality and readiness of the network’s response.  
SMEs generally contact the EICs to receive information on EU related topics. The role of the 
network as the EU interface with the local level seems to be evolving over time, as many 
evaluations demonstrate, due to the growing complexity of SMEs needs in a fast-changing 
economic landscape. As a consequence, EICs also boost their advisory role on an increasing 
amount of topics and strategies related to the everyday life of SMEs. In 2005, the network 
received about 300,000 enquiries, mainly on business cooperation (50,000 questions), 
Community programmes and sources of finance (40,000 questions), internationalisation of 
SMEs (10,000 questions), EU legislation and public procurement (19,000 questions).16 
Events, workshops, info days and publications are also organised by the network. 
As far as the feedback to EU institutions is concerned, besides the normal reporting to 
Commission services dealing with EICs, the centres actively participate to the Interactive 
Policy Making (IPM) initiative by channelling relevant information on SMEs needs to the 
European Commission.   
The main goals and activities of the EIC network are summarised in table 3 below. 
 
Table 3  
Goals, actions and outputs of the EIC network pillar 
General goals falling under the 
pillar 
Type of action Expected outputs 
• Informative and advisory role 
• Promotion of business 
cooperation 
 
 
• Information and advice to SMEs 
• Workshops, conferences, info-
days 
• Publications  
• Signposting to other members of 
the network and other networks 
• IPM  
• Feedback to the European 
Commission 
• Reports and data on SMEs needs 
• IPM 
5. Giving business easier access to 
Community support services, 
programmes and networks and 
improving the coordination of 
these facilities 
• Network management • Meetings and training activities 
• Intranet 
• Exchange of information and best 
practices 
                                                 
16 For further details, see Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship 2001-2005, 
Implementation Report 2005, (hereinafter Implementation Report), pag. 49. 
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2.3.4 Other actions 
This category comprises a limited number of projects (6 in total, according to the latest MAP 
implementation report) that cannot be automatically linked to any of the specific pillars 
described so far. These actions, such as the Enterprise Europe newsletter or initiatives for the 
dissemination of information on the European Charter for Small Enterprises, generally 
contribute to raising the awareness on MAP activities. 
Probably the best known project is the Observatory of European SMEs, established by the 
Commission in December 1992 in order to improve the monitoring of the economic 
performance of SMEs in Europe. Its task is to provide information on SMEs to policy-makers, 
researchers, economists and SMEs themselves. The project involves significant human and 
financial resources.  
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3 Ex post evaluation of the MAP 2001-2005 
This section provides an ex post evaluation of the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and 
utility of the practical implementation of the MAP in the period 2001-2005. Although the 
terms of reference required CEPS to cover the 2000-2005 timeframe, CEPS observe that more 
relevant information on the MAP initiative and better orientation for the forthcoming CIP can 
be drawn from the evaluation of activities carried out between 2001 and 2006. As a matter of 
fact, many projects implemented in 2000 cover the concluding phase of the 3rd MAP and were 
often continued under the 2001-2005 edition. 
Section 3.1 illustrates the results of the ex post evaluations of the MAP programme carried out 
by the European Commission, by external evaluators and by ourselves, whereas in section 3.2 
we provide an evaluation of the individual MAP pillars and their related actions.  
3.1 General comments 
Drawing from the lessons learned from its predecessor, the MAP 2001-2005 tried to remedy 
many of the shortcomings of the previous intervention and incorporated the majority of the 
suggestions proposed in the external evaluation of the 3rd MAP. In particular, efforts were 
devoted to achieve a better structuring of the Programme, an increase in the allocation of 
financial and human resources to policy development activities, a reduction in the number of 
ineffective and costly small-scale activities and pilot projects. Positive features of the 3rd 
MAP, such as the broad scope of the Programme addressing SMEs needs in various critical 
areas, were retained in the 2001-2005 Programme. Existing stakeholders’ consultation 
mechanisms and the exchange of information between competent Commission DGs were 
strengthened. On the other hand, some of the shortcomings of the 3rd MAP (e.g. poor 
dissemination methods and a general lack of communication of implemented activities to final 
beneficiaries) were not sufficiently tackled. In addition, new weaknesses emerged during the 
implementation of the new edition, mostly related to the changing landscape in which 
enterprises operate and to some specific features of the Programme, as will be explained in 
the following sections. 
An ex post evaluation of the MAP 2001-2005 was carried out both by the European 
Commission and external evaluators.17 The results of these reports portrait a mixed picture, 
with some actions being particularly effective and useful for SMEs, and others still exhibiting 
a significant margin for improvement. The most important findings are presented below: 
• MAP global objectives are generally relevant to SMEs. The five goals cover some 
important areas that exert an impact on the life of European enterprises. Such an opinion 
was confirmed also by the interviewed stakeholders. Interestingly, however, policy 
makers and project managers are giving a more positive judgment than the final recipients 
of the Programme (SMEs). Activities within the policy development pillar reached an 
aggregate average score of 3.5 out of 5 in terms of perceived relevance and actual or 
expected impacts among policy makers, whereas they scored on average 3.2 among 
business sector representatives. These are not impressive scores, and in the case of 
business representatives the scores can be partly attributed to the low level of awareness 
                                                 
17 See European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General, Intermediate Evaluation, cit.; and INFYDE 
S.L./Lacave Allemand & Asssociés, cit. 
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of the results obtained by the MAP – as a matter of fact, these economic actors are only 
indirectly affected by the Programme initiatives. A second reason that will be explained in 
greater detail below is linked to the dissemination strategy of MAP itself. 
• However, the three pillars seem to lack a holistic approach in supporting SMEs in their 
daily struggle to survive or to grow. Within the triangle of SMEs, financiers and 
intermediaries, the crucial role played by accountants and administrative offices (AOs) in 
filling the finance gap was not sufficiently addressed. These intermediaries are key in 
solving the problem of building the much needed credit history and financial/cash flow 
forecasts, and could play an important role in the credit assessment process, especially for 
starters and young small companies. These procedures will become more important with 
the coming of Basel II. A greater attention to these intermediaries could significantly 
decrease overhead costs (which often represent prohibitive bottlenecks in the field of 
micro credits or small loans), at the same time substantially reducing the information 
asymmetry and the so-called agency problem. 
• Furthermore, a pillar aiming at providing a permanent education and information channel 
to SMEs could contribute strongly to the holistic approach adopted by the Commission. E-
learning modules may prove very effective in increasing the knowledge and understanding 
of new or young entrepreneurs about how the (international) business community thinks 
and works, how to get prepared and where to ask when there is a financing or other need, 
what kind of mechanisms can be activated, etc. 
• The degree of implementation of planned actions is in and of itself generally satisfactory 
and contributed to the achievement of the general and specific MAP goals. Nonetheless, 
results vary across and within pillars. At the end of 2004, the Programme showed an 
advanced level of implementation with 171 policy development outcomes, 41 deals with 
financial intermediaries and 276 EICs receiving direct support.18 Implemented projects 
produced direct results whenever they contributed to change policy approaches or to the 
creation of new financial instruments. In addition to this, positive indirect effects were 
generated when the conditions of final beneficiaries improved after the implementation of 
a specific project. 
• In terms of efficiency, MAP 2001-2005 had an initial estimated budget of about 450 
million Euros. At the end of 2003, 95% of the resources were committed.19 However, 
information is lacking on the rate of return on budgetary resources allocated to the 
different programmes. 
• From a management perspective, the use of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) and 
the increased focus on benchmarking and exchange of best practices delivered the 
expected results and raised the awareness of key stakeholders at the national level. The 
latter aspect is particularly crucial given that there is no exclusive Community competence 
for enterprise policy and thus decisions have to be taken and implemented both at the EU 
and member state level. Nonetheless, as emerged from the ex post evaluation carried out 
by INFYDE et al. (2005), the complexity of the OMC might render this method too 
cumbersome and potentially ineffective in the long run, if clear goals and objectives are 
not defined ex-ante. 
                                                 
18 For further details see INFYDE S.L./ Lacave Allemand & Asssociés, cit. 
19 Id., p. 18. 
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However, besides these encouraging findings, other aspects of the MAP were found to be 
more disappointing according to interviewed stakeholders and policymakers. Weaknesses are 
already evident at the general level, and their potentially negative impacts may affect the 
effectiveness and utility of the whole Programme. 
• The link between general and specific goals appears weak. As also noted by the 
Commission itself, it is sometimes difficult to understand how specific goals contribute to 
the achievement of the general objectives.20 For example, a closer look at the five general 
objectives shows that they cannot be considered all at the same level: while the first two 
seem to be very broad, the other three are more specific and already exhibit an operational 
focus, thus giving different levels of orientation to their respective pillars. This in turn is 
reflected at the intermediate level of the Programme, where the foundation of the 
operational part of MAP should be set:  
o when specific objectives are not clearly defined and do not provide a clear 
direction for the activities to be carried out at the lower levels of implementation, 
effective and easily identifiable outputs are difficult to identify. A telling example 
is the financial pillar. This pillar was mostly meant to assist innovative and high 
growth SMEs in financing their activities: however, the lion’s share has been 
directed to traditional companies. This raises the issue of substitution of credit 
risks from the private sector to the community level. It is a well known market fact 
that traditional companies are often able to maintain a sustainable growth path and 
produce stable cash flows. These companies normally gain access to finance more 
easily than innovative or high growth companies with fluctuating cash flows.   
o in some cases the objectives of planned actions did not go much beyond re-stating 
what was expressed by the general MAP goals and thus projects delivered 
insufficient added value to the Programme.  
o in some other cases, specific objectives were too narrowly defined and only weakly 
linked to the architecture of the MAP. Thus, even if an implemented project had a 
positive impact when considered individually, its role in the overall MAP context 
was not always easily understandable. This way, potential synergies and positive 
spillovers effects were lost and the positive impact of the Programme was reduced. 
• Another weakness of the general design of the MAP is linked to the quality of the 
indicators used for evaluating the single projects. Even though an assessment of the 
indicators does not strictly fall within the scope of this evaluation, they should be taken 
into account to the extent that they contribute to the effective implementation of the 
projects.21 As previously mentioned, indicators can be grouped in the following 
categories/typologies: participation, deliverables (both in quantitative and qualitative 
terms), implementation and effectiveness. These can be further broken down in sub-
categories with a stronger operational focus, depending on the needs of the project at 
hand. Available evaluations pointed out that despite the fact that each indicator can be 
                                                 
20 European Commission, Enterprise Directorate-General, Intermediate Evaluation, cit., p. 18.  
21 For further details, an ad hoc evaluation of the indicators used for the Best Procedure projects has been carried 
out and some of its conclusions could easily be extended to the indicators used in other actions within the MAP 
programme. European Commission, Enterprise and Industry Directorate General, Best Report on the use of 
indicators in the monitoring and evaluation of SME-related actions, Final Report of the Expert Group, March 
2006. 
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traced back to one of the four categories mentioned above, their practical application was 
sometimes patchy or unclear. In some cases, they failed to reveal the real state of project 
implementation – for the 16 policy development projects surveyed in the Commission 
final report, as many as 12 out of 16 participation indicators did not reveal any relevant 
information – while in other situations they ended up being more objectives per se than 
measurement tools, because of the lack of operational focus of the project at hand.22 
Finally, some indicators were not linked to any specific target and thus could not fulfil 
their measurement task.  
• According to surveys carried out during the implementation of the Programme, MAP 
scores poorly in terms of dissemination and communication to the wider public. This is 
particularly true for final beneficiaries, as they are not directly targeted by MAP activities. 
Even if some progress has been made (e.g., the online publication of MAP annual work 
programmes, following the recommendations provided in the intermediate evaluation of 
the Programme), SMEs still exhibit limited knowledge of the Programme and of the 
opportunities it offers. Moreover, whenever the latter indirectly benefit from MAP actions 
they are not always aware of the role played by the Programme. This happens for example 
with the financial pillar: as reported by business representatives during an interview, some 
financial intermediaries fail to mention the EC contribution when they finance SMEs 
under one of the MAP schemes. In other cases, instead, an excess of uncoordinated 
communication initiatives diminished the impact of the information provided. Conversely, 
project officers, financial intermediaries and EU officials are for obvious reasons better 
informed on the Programme and its instruments, and were less affected by this 
shortcoming.  
• Compared to the previous MAP, the 2001-2005 edition can count on improved 
coordination mechanisms both at the EU level (communication between Commission 
DGs) and at the national one. For example, the exchange of best practices and the 
increased organisation of training and dissemination activities constituted a valuable 
incentive for public administrations. Nonetheless, the coordination between MAP and 
other Community initiatives targeting SMEs (e.g. Structural Funds, RDT Framework 
Programmes) was not always smooth. In some cases, unnecessary overlapping has been 
observed, for example between existing support networks or between the scope of 
financial instruments and other Community funding schemes. In other cases, intervention 
gaps were not filled or there was insufficient feedback between complementary actions, 
for example between the projects implementing the Charter for Small Enterprises and 
other MAP activities. This can be partly attributed to a residual lack of communication 
between and within competent DGs in the European Commission, a shortcoming of 
previous programmes that has only been partially remedied in the current MAP.23  
As regards the quality of results, this varied noticeably among the pillars and is sometimes 
mixed, especially when outputs depended on external factors that could not be influenced by 
project managers. This is particularly true for the policy development pillar, where the 
political component is stronger: projects were often delayed or did not produce the expected 
outcomes. Conversely, the quality of outputs produced by long-established structures such as 
the EICs increased over time, thus showing the potential for lesson drawing for the whole 
                                                 
22 European Commission, Enterprise and Industry Directorate-General, Intermediate Evaluation, cit., p. 19. 
23 For example, by the creation of the SME Envoy in 2004.  
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Programme. A more detailed analysis of the outcomes of the individual pillars is provided 
below. 
3.2 Comments on individual pillars 
3.2.1 Policy development pillar 
Mainly because of its broad scope, this pillar produced mixed results. On the one hand it set 
the basis for some highly successful MAP actions, such as some of the Best Procedure 
Projects, on the other it also comprised many small-scale activities that did not really take up 
or were significantly delayed. 
 
Relevance 
Actions carried out under this heading can be qualified as relevant in general, as they targeted 
the problems affecting the administrative and regulatory environment in which businesses 
operate, and launched a series of initiatives aimed at promoting entrepreneurship.24 The pillar 
has a horizontal function and addressed policy development issues in different fields affecting 
SMEs.  
 
Effectiveness 
Projects were effective as they increased the involvement of public administrations, raised the 
awareness of national officials on the main needs of SMEs and in some cases led to policy 
changes or targeted regulatory intervention at the national and local level. The 171 outcomes 
obtained by the end of 2004 include 39 meetings, 34 conferences and seminars, 62 studies and 
reports, 9 databases, and 27 dissemination materials.25 As already mentioned, the focus on 
benchmarking techniques and exchange of best practices really hit the target among public 
administrations in the member states, thus multiplying the benefits of Community 
intervention in an area were the EU does not have exclusive competences. According to 
business representatives, these actions should be strengthened as the EU intervention is 
believed to play a catalytic role on SME-friendly policies at the national level. 
The overall effectiveness of the policy development pillar was sometimes hampered by 
projects with weak specific objectives, poor operational targets or underperforming indicators 
that failed to remedy to the shortcomings emerging during the implementation phase. In this 
respect, it has to be noted that in the policy development pillar, the general problem of the 
missing link between overarching and specific goals affecting the MAP is most evident. 
Moreover, some projects were too small and led to the fragmentation of both human and 
                                                 
24 According to the European Commission’s Intermediate Evaluation (pp. 26-30), 87% of respondents 
considered the subject of the policy development projects as relevant. The percentage is even higher (95%) for 
particularly successful initiatives such as Benchmarking National Policies in support for e-business for SMEs, 
Transfer of Businesses, Support Services and Business Failures and Bankruptcy. Conversely, the expected 
impact of projects on final beneficiaries scores only slightly above average: 3.2 in a 1-5 scale. Interviewees 
expected a small-to medium-level impact for 7 projects out of the surveyed 16, while 8 other projects were 
considered has having a potentially medium-level to strong-level impact. Only the project on Factoring and 
Credit Insurance scored extremely well. Data for each project are provided in Annex V of the Intermediate 
Evaluation. 
25 See INFYDE S.L./ Lacave Allemand & Asssociés (2005), cit., p. 15. 
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financial resources, with a negative impact on the cost effectiveness of the pillar and the 
whole Programme. 
 
Efficiency 
In terms of efficiency, resources were generally correctly distributed among planned actions 
and successfully committed in many cases. The estimated average cost per output is 
€135,000, a figure that nevertheless hides the negative impact of small scale actions on the 
overall efficiency of the pillar.26 Such actions should be avoided in the future as they reduced 
both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the intervention and exhibited a high opportunity 
cost, by depriving well-functioning projects of potentially useful resources. Excessive 
fragmentation had a negative impact also on the organisational level, as the threshold for 
projects that need to be approved by the EPMC was quite low: too many actions had to be 
scrutinised by limited human resources and the whole process was slowed down, with 
negative consequences on potentially effective projects calling for fast implementation. This 
problem has been remedied by raising the above-mentioned threshold. 
 
Utility 
As far as the utility of MAP is concerned, policy development projects generally 
corresponded to the needs identified and the problems to be solved. In particular, Best 
Projects contributed to improving the environment in which SMEs operate and set the basis 
for well-targeted future actions. Some of the projects are already a follow-up of previous 
activities and shall be continued in the future (e.g., projects promoting entrepreneurship) to 
reap the benefits of the lessons learned so far. Despite the fact that positive results are visible 
for single projects, it is impossible to draw a final judgment on the overall utility of the policy 
development pillar, as many of the actions will only have a visible impact in the long term. 
Moreover, as already recalled, the selected indicators do not provide sufficient information. 
One point can nevertheless be made and was also confirmed by other evaluations and 
implementation reports: projects such as data collection and complex one-off studies are 
neither very effective nor efficient. The quality of outputs was not always satisfactory and the 
results achieved were sometimes too complex to be used for contributing to policy-making. 
Moreover, such projects are generally time consuming and – especially in the case of 
databases – require considerable human and financial resources to be created and updated 
overtime. A comparison of costs and benefits leads to the conclusion that such initiatives 
should be discontinued, as they do not really address the specific needs of final beneficiaries 
and use resources that could be better allocated elsewhere. 
Finally, policy development initiatives suffer sometimes from the poor dissemination 
strategies that characterise most MAP projects. In some cases, successful projects lacked the 
visibility they deserved and their perceived impact was reduced, especially among final 
beneficiaries. An improved communication strategy could raise the awareness of relevant 
stakeholders and promote new initiatives with positive spillovers and multiplying effects in 
the long run. 
                                                 
26 Id., at page 18. 
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Table 4 
Policy development pillar – summary of findings 
Evaluation criteria Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Relevance • Appropriate objectives 
• Projects designed to improve business 
environment 
• Projects designed to promote 
entrepreneurship 
• Fulfils complementary horizontal 
functions 
• Generally appropriate allocation of 
budget 
• Some one-off measures and databases not 
adequately planned or did not deliver 
considerable net benefits 
 
Effectiveness • Involvement of public administration  
• Increased awareness among relevant 
stakeholders  
• Fostered some policy changes or targeted 
regulatory intervention  
• Added a European dimension to national 
SMEs policies 
• Lack of clear operational objectives in 
some cases 
• Some fragmentation of human and 
financial resources 
• Poor quality of indicators 
Efficiency • Balanced allocation of funding 
• Generally low spending/number of results 
ratio 
• Small projects led to inefficient and costly 
fragmentation of the budget and to slower 
implementation 
• Overstretching of limited human and 
financial resources at the management 
level leading to delay 
Utility • Better environment for SMEs 
• Promotion of entrepreneurial culture 
• Successful follow-up of existing projects 
• Introduction of benchmarking  
• Development of a best practice culture 
• Databases and complex studies not 
responding to specific needs 
• Poor dissemination reduced impact 
 
3.2.2 Financial instruments pillar  
As previously mentioned, this is the most important pillar in terms of budget allocation and 
expenditure, covering 70.3% of overall funds. This pillar is aimed at supporting SMEs over 
their lifecycle from the start-up phase (ETF-SU, Seed Capital Action) to the growth and 
expansion phases (SMEG). The approval of projects managed by the EIF only started in May 
2002, following the end of the commitment period under the Growth and Employment 
Initiative. As far as the involvement of the new member states is concerned, the formal 
implementation notice for the participation to the financial instruments was published in 
February 2003. Budget commitments will last through 2006 and a part of 2007, as the 
concrete use of the CIP budget is likely to start in 2008. 
When managing the financial schemes, the EIF has to follow specific criteria to ensure a 
balanced geographic coverage for the three financial instruments and a thorough consideration 
of country characteristics in each case.27 
                                                 
27 The Fiduciary and Management Agreements between the EIF and the European Commission set the following 
four criteria for a correct management of the financial instruments: 
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Relevance 
The three financial instruments are undoubtedly relevant in addressing the need for finance 
over the life cycle of SMEs. The ETF start-up scheme and the seed financing facility are 
supposedly helping to bridge the so-called “valley of death” where SMEs find themselves in 
the first years of their lives (see Figure 2 in Section 2 above). 
The SME guarantee facility is best positioned to provide finance in a later growth phase. As is 
suggested by the underlying loan volume supported (Euro 12.3 billion and a very high 
leverage rate) the scheme is in any case relevant to financial institutions. However, leverage 
ratios do not provide any information about whether the assisted companies were indeed 
unable to raise finance by other means. The fact that beneficiaries seem to be traditional 
companies raises the issue of risk substitution from the private sector to the Community level. 
Notwithstanding the positive opinion expressed by business representatives during the 
interviews, risk substitution is certainly not among the intended results of this instrument.  
Moreover, the expansion of the SME guarantee facility under the MAP 2001-2005 – with the 
addition of the micro-credit, ICT and equity windows – led to mixed results.28 
The micro credit facility (very small loans) is quite different from the other schemes, as it is 
directed to disadvantaged social groups that are willing to start a company. In this credit 
domain, bottlenecks are hard to overcome without government intervention (background of 
the entrepreneur, prohibitive overhead costs of risk assessment and risk management, and 
questionable business cases). The fact that 11,200 small firms are already being supported by 
this scheme (with an allocated budget of €32 million) suggests that this scheme is quite 
successful in the implementation phase. Moreover, the whole pillar gave credibility to 
financed initiatives as the “Community brand” brings further added value on the market to 
both intermediaries and final beneficiaries. Additionally, the scheme could also lead to 
gaining expertise by financial institutions on how to deal with small firms and change their 
attitude over time. The micro credit facility could be judged as successful if future evidence 
shows that the survival rate of the financed firms is encouraging and their dependency on the 
facility is decreasing. On this, it is anyway too early to judge. 
To the contrary, the introduction of the ICT and equity window was not successful. 
Programmes were not matching market needs (general loan schemes were more preferable 
than the special ICT window) or were executed in a non acceptable way for market 
participants). The conclusion, therefore, is that these new facilities were not relevant. 
 
Effectiveness 
At the end of 2003, the EIF had already signed SME Guarantee Facility contracts with 48 
financial intermediaries for a total amount of EUR 308 millions, under the Growth and 
                                                                                                                                                        
⎯ To achieve a balanced global country coverage for the three financial instruments taken together; 
⎯ To allow each member state to benefit from at least one financial instrument; 
⎯ To respect a minimum size necessary for a specific operation to be viable; 
⎯ To take into account the characteristics of the different markets. 
For further details, see European Commission, Report on the financial instruments of the multiannual 
programme for enterprise and entrepreneurship, and in particular for small and medium-sized enterprises 2001-
2005 as at 31 December 2003, published 30.09.2004. 
28 The Scheme already existed under the Growth and Employment Initiative. 
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Employment programme 1998-2000 and the MAP. As a consequence in 2005, 192,000 SMEs 
had benefited from the facility, compared with 166,279 in December 2003 and 127,812 a year 
earlier. During the same period the EIF had signed 21 contracts with venture capital funds 
under the ETF-SU scheme, for a total amount of EUR 126 millions. As reported by the 
European Commission, these venture capital funds have raised an amount of EUR 602 
million, providing a leverage effect that seems to deliver a tangible proof of the effectiveness 
of this type of schemes.29  
The activity of the EIF has continuously expanded in subsequent years. At the end of 2005, 
EIF had entered into 45 agreements in 27 countries, for a total guarantee commitment of EUR 
6,328 million and the estimated underlying loan volume supported by these intermediaries 
under MAP and its predecessor was EUR 18,328 million to more than 260,000 businesses. In 
2005 alone, EIF signed 25 guarantee operations, including extensions, amounting to EUR 1.2 
billion.  
More generally, the effectiveness of this pillar is usually measured by indicators of the 
leverage effect of funds allocated by the Commission (underlying loan volume supported 
divided by allocated budget).30 In particular: 
•  340 million Euros were allocated to the SMEG instrument, mobilising approximately €24 
billion of investments, with a leverage effect of (70:1); 
• Venture capital early stage investments under the ETF-SU scheme totalled 170 million 
and mobilised €0.85 billion investments, with a leverage effect of (5:1). 
Overall, €510 million mobilised around €25 billions of investments, with an average leverage 
effect of (20.4:1).  
Table 5 below shows the leverage effects of the loan, micro-credit and equity guarantee 
windows of the SMEG instrument at the end of 2005. These results suggest that the financial 
instruments pillar has proven to be effective over the 2000-2005 period.  
Table 5 
Leverage effect at 31 December 2005 in terms of estimated volume of loans 
Allocated 
budget 
(signed) 
Estimated 
underlying loan 
volume supported 
Maximum EIF 
Guarantee 
Amount 
Leverage 
effect 
 
EUR million EUR million EUR million  
Loan guarantee window 173.8 12,352.5 3,624.1 75 
Micro-credit window 32.1 259.1 177.6 8.1 
Equity guarantee window 17.3 306.3 89.4 17.7 
Total 223.2 12,917.9 3,891.1 60.34 
       Source: European Commission, MEMO/06/259, 30 June 2006 
                                                 
29 For further details, see European Commission, The activities of the European Union for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) – SME Envoy report, COM (2005) 30 final, p. 24-25. 
30 Defined as the capacity of MAP financial instruments to induce additional spending among financial 
intermediaries, and measured as “estimated underlying volume of funds or loans supported / ETF-SU or SMEG 
allocated budget (signed)” ratio. For more details, see INFYDE S.L./ Lacave Allemand & Asssociés (2005), cit. 
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The leverage effect of the financial instruments pillar has also improved over time. In 2003, 
the leverage effect for the SMEG instrument was 50:1, whereas the Commission reported an 
overall leverage of 70:1 by the end of 2005. Likewise, the gearing for the ETF-SU scheme 
was 4:1 in 2003, and had risen to 5:1 in 2005. Figures provided by the EIF state that by the 
end of 2004, an initial capital allocation of EUR 165.9 million generated a guarantee volume 
of EUR 2,702.9 million, a loan volume of EUR 10,150 million and an investment volume of 
EUR 17,400 million.31 On this issue, however, it is worth recalling that leverage effects would 
appear lower if the estimated underlying loan volume were benchmarked against the 
maximum guarantee liabilities of the Community arising from these guarantees (the real 
economic risks). 
However, the fact that the lion’s share of funding is flowing to the traditional companies 
deserves further comments. In particular, as already recalled, it has to be seen whether these 
companies were not able to get funding otherwise. If the answer is negative an undesirable 
substitution of credit risk from the private sector to the Community level might have taken 
place. Furthermore, not much is known about the contribution of these schemes to growth, 
employment or productivity for the economy as a whole. There are also no indicators to 
measure the innovativeness of new capital investments and the competitive position of the 
firms involved. As a result, while access to finance was most probably made significantly 
easier, it is impossible to conclude that financial intermediaries actually took more risks than 
they would have done without the existence of the Programme and that a significant number 
of companies with significant potential could enter the market thanks to the MAP financial 
instruments. 
The ICT guarantee and equity window showed that facilities that are not in line with market 
needs or with the way in which markets normally carry out business are doomed to fail. To 
the contrary, a broader instrument like the SMEG equity window was only hit by a slower 
take-up but is expected to be effective in the medium and long term. Thus, one can conclude 
that the most effective way of intervening is to keep facilities as broad in scope and as flexible 
as possible, in order to fill arising gaps in financial markets and answer in a timely manner to 
the changing needs of European SMEs. 
As regards the effectiveness of the ETF start-up facility, it is still to early too draw a definitive 
judgment. Despite the satisfactory leverage effects reported, interviewed business 
representatives pointed out that the MAP did not solve the problems of European venture 
capital markets. The main shortcoming lies in the rules that discipline the allocation of EU 
funding. The EIF participation can reach 50% of the fund thus putting this institution in the 
same position as private investors. This pari passu approach constitutes a disincentive for 
private investors to mobilize more capital in funds supporting SMEs. Moreover, the market 
offers other attractive investment opportunities for private capital and only a limited number 
of projects have been funded so far. According to one interviewee, more effective and 
efficient results could be obtained by changing the pari passu approach and using Community 
funding to support projects, including information activities, that stimulate private investment 
in venture capital instruments targeting SMEs. 
As far as the geographic coverage of the financial instruments is concerned, results were not 
fully satisfactory in the first years of the MAP’s implementation. Greece, Portugal and 
                                                 
31 See EIF, Multiannual Programme 2001-2005, presentation by Christa KARIS at the SME Guarantee Facility 
Conference 2005, Luxembourg 28 April, 2005. 
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Luxembourg were not covered under the MAP at the end of 2003, and could only benefit 
from schemes inherited from the MAP’s predecessor. Germany accounted for 28% of the 
budgetary commitments under the three facilities, France for 18%, followed by Italy (13%) 
and Spain (10%), the United Kingdom and Sweden (4%), Finland, Denmark and the 
Netherlands (3%). Among the new member states, only the Czech Republic and Latvia had a 
share of the funding accounting for 2% and 1% of the budgetary commitments, respectively. 
The situation has evolved over the years and in 2005 all EU member states plus Bulgaria, 
Norway, Romania and Turkey benefited from at least one of the MAP financial instruments.32 
National differences are partly caused by the structure of the local financial markets and, 
especially in the case of the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe, by a lower 
number of financial intermediaries and the small size of national venture capital markets. 
According to one interviewee, until institutional structures are not sufficiently developed the 
potential of guarantee schemes cannot be fully exploited. Against this background, training 
activities financed under this pillar before EU enlargement proved very effective and 
generated positive spillover effects on the management of structural funds in the targeted 
countries. 
Over half of the loans granted under the MAP 2001-2005 were below EUR 25,000. More data 
on this aspect are provided in the table below. 
Table 6 
Size and breakdown of loans 
Loan Size (EUR) Breakdown 
0-25k 59% 
25-50k 17% 
50-75k 7% 
75-100 k 5% 
100-200k 7% 
200-500k 4% 
500-1000k 1% 
1000-2500k 0% 
Over 2500k 0% 
           Source: EIF (2005) 
 
More specific data on the size and geographical distribution of the single facilities are 
available only for the guarantee facility and for the years 2002 and 2003. The data are not 
really comparable as in 2002 the SMEG facility was not yet broken into different windows. 
Nonetheless, it appears that in both cases, Italy has the highest number of beneficiary SMEs 
receiving an average loan amount of EUR 61,000 in 2002 and 58,000 in 2003.33  
                                                 
32 See KARIS C. (2005), cit. 
33 For further details, see European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
the Council, Measures on financial assistance for innovative and job creating small and medium-sized 
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According to data available for 9 member states34, in 2003 the majority of beneficiaries SMEs 
(90.5%) under the guarantee scheme had between 0 and 5 employees. This proportion slightly 
changed in the following years and now SMEs with 0 to 5 employees represent 83% of the 
beneficiaries, followed by those with up to 10 employees (8%) and up to 20 employees (5%).  
From the distribution of loans according to size and staff numbers, we can conclude that loans 
are indeed distributed to the target group of SMEs. Nonetheless, as already recalled it must be 
ascertained whether the loan scheme was the only source of finance for these companies, or 
whether significant risk substitution has taken place as an undesired consequence of 
Community loans. 
As far as the sectoral distribution is concerned, manufacturing gets the lion’s share of the 
funding under the loan guarantee facility (39%), followed by wholesale and retail trade (14%) 
and construction (12%), while transport and telecommunications enterprises account for 7% 
of the beneficiaries. For the microcredit window, SMEs involved in wholesale and trade 
activities constitute 28% of beneficiaries, followed by real estates and other business activities 
(19%) and community service activities (13%). The majority of final beneficiaries (66%) 
were established since one or two years. Thus, we conclude that the guarantee window is 
mainly supporting traditional enterprises with less than 10 employees and in the early stages 
of their lives.   
Under the ETF-SU schemes, France was the country with the highest number of deals (5) at 
the end of 2005, followed by Germany and Belgium (2). Two deals were launched on a pan-
European basis. 19 contractual agreements out of 21 are in the technological sector. 
As far as the impact on employment is concerned, data are available only for the Guarantee 
Facility until December 2003 and only state the aggregate number (100,800) of staff 
employed by the beneficiaries when loans were granted.35 The lack of data on employment 
growth for the following years makes it impossible to draw a final conclusion on the 
effectiveness of such financial scheme. For the ETF-SU little information was available, 
while the JEV, as confirmed by the Commission, had a much lower impact than expected, and 
was considered to be “demonstrably ineffective and inefficient”36 
 
 
 
Efficiency 
As far as efficiency is concerned, financial instruments score positively. The budget of each 
instrument was allocated and distributed efficiently. The implementation chain DG 
                                                                                                                                                        
enterprises (1998 Growth and employment Initiative) as at 31 December 2002, COM (2003) 480 final, p. 33 and 
European Commission Report on Financial Instruments, cit., p.36. 
34 Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Finland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, UK. Data refer to the micro-credit and 
the loan guarantee windows. The rest of the funding is distributed as follows: 5% to SMEs with 6-10 employees, 
3% to SMEs with 11-20 employees, 1.0% to SMEs with 21-50 employees and 0.5% to enterprises with up to 100 
employees. For further details, refer to European Commission, Report on Financial Instruments, cit., p.37.  
35 See INFYDE S.L./ Lacave Allemand & Asssociés (2005), cit., at 6. More detailed information is available for 
the Growth and Employment Initiative. According to the European Commission, beneficiaries targeted by the 
Guarantee Facility had a total of 464,839 employees in June 2002 and forecasted the creation of 98,438 new jobs 
in the following two years.  
36 European Commission, Report on Financial Instruments, cit. p. 19-20. 
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Enterprise-DG Ecfin-EIF was praised both by institutional and financial stakeholders, as it is 
a well functioning mechanism that scrutinises the market attentively before distributing funds 
in order to avoid distortions. The initial allocation between the three financial schemes 
managed by the EIF had to be corrected due to the overestimated demand for the Seed Capital 
Action scheme, which turned out being a minor instrument37. The budgetary appropriations 
for 2002 and 2003 (EUR 5.6 million and EUR 5.11 million) were thus reallocated to the two 
other schemes. 38  
Initiatives like the JEV were not found to be highly efficient, but this seems to be related more 
to the administrative side of the facility that to the choices in the budget distribution per se. In 
the JEV case, the need to control that the same enterprise did not abuse the system by 
benefiting twice from funding opportunities both under the MAP and the structural funds, led 
to complex and expensive bureaucracy procedures that hampered the functioning of the 
facility itself and used many financial resources that could have been allocated more 
efficiently elsewhere.   
 
Utility 
The financial instruments proved useful as they managed to partially bridge the gap between 
SMEs financial needs and funding opportunities available on the market, in some cases 
anticipating the expected positive outcomes of other Community initiatives such as the Basel 
II framework. The need for easier access to finance will remain a real priority for European 
SMEs, thus this pillar will and should be continued and constantly improved in the future 
generations of programmes.  
According to some representatives from the business community, one of the shortcomings of 
the MAP financial pillar was the excessive focus on innovative sectors, while traditional 
SMEs – that still constitute the majority of European enterprises – were somehow left behind. 
This perception, however, is not fully confirmed by observed data. More importantly, a real 
challenge of the MAP is to stimulate these companies, which represent a major part of the 
business society (80 to 90%), to leave their sustainable growth path and to become fast 
growing companies. This could partly be achieved by opening new (public) sources of equity 
finance (new financial instruments) and opening new management perspectives by supporting 
the role of intermediaries. In this respect, the contribution of traditional businesses to growth 
and employment should not be underestimated. In this particular case, the lack of financial 
facilities supporting enterprises in later stages of their lives was often underlined, as access to 
finance, especially in traditional sectors or even for innovative but capital intensive SMEs (i.e 
biotech enterprises), is crucial for the survival of successful enterprises. As will be explained 
below in Section 4, this shortcoming has been partially remedied by the CIP.  
Again, the financial instruments pillar scores poorly in terms of dissemination. 
Communicating and marketing implemented actions in the case of financial facilities is 
essential and has a tangible and direct impact on the effectiveness and utility of the pillar 
itself. For example, some interviewed financial intermediaries declared that they would have 
taken part in the existing programmes, had they known that such initiatives existed. 
Moreover, SMEs themselves are not always aware of the fact that some of the support they 
                                                 
37 See INFYDE S.L./ Lacave Allemand & Asssociés (2005), cit., at 5. 
38 European Commission, Report on the Financial Instruments, cit. 
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receive has a Community origin or that their local financial intermediary could receive 
funding to facilitate access to finance for SMEs. Thus, because of insufficient information and 
dissemination strategies many potential beneficiaries of projects within the financial pillar 
have not been reached by MAP. 
Table 7 
Summary of findings – Financial instruments pillar 
Evaluation criteria Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Relevance • Appropriate objectives 
• Coherent budget allocation 
mechanisms 
• Coherent budget distribution 
• Appropriate choice of 
beneficiaries 
• Insufficient action on traditional 
SMEs for the financial needs 
arising in the growth and 
expansion stages 
 
Effectiveness • High leverage effects for SMEG  
• Satisfactory leverage effects for 
ETF-SU 
• High number of final 
beneficiaries reached (260,000) 
• Micro-credit window increased 
access to finance and bankability 
• Increased investment by 
intermediaries 
• Enhanced credibility for targeted 
actors 
• Failure of JEV project 
• ICT-loan guarantee window was 
not used 
•  The pari passu approach failed to 
stimulate private investment in 
venture capital instruments 
• Potential of SCA could be 
exploited better 
• Poor dissemination diminished 
positive spillovers 
• Some lack of flexibility 
Efficiency • Balanced allocation of funding 
• Accurate analysis of the market 
• Significant distortions avoided 
• Some resources were lost in 
complex bureaucratic procedures 
• SCA budget initially 
overestimated 
Utility • Easier access to finance 
• Pro- and counter-cyclical effects 
• Solid base for follow-up actions 
• Excessive focus on innovative 
enterprises penalized traditional 
sector 
• Missed support for later stage 
finance needs of SMEs 
 
 
3.2.3 Euro Info Centres  
A challenging task for the MAP was to adapt the already existing EIC network (since 1987) to 
the increasingly complex demands of SMEs and the specific problems of the EU enlargement. 
The nature of the network itself has also changed, and many points are now not only 
providing information to final beneficiaries but have also developed advising roles in specific 
areas that are of particular interest for SMEs, such as internationalisation, public procurement, 
tendering procedures, etc. As a consequence, it is often impossible to distinguish progress 
achieved thanks to the MAP from those fostered by the needs of an enlarged EU. 
In connection with the MAP, the EIC network plays two main roles: on the one hand, 
informing and advising SMEs on EU-related matters; on the other, providing feedback about 
SMEs to relevant Commission services. These two activities will be evaluated separately.  
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EIC: the informative role  
As already mentioned, the network received about 300,000 enquiries in 2005, mainly on 
business cooperation (50,000 questions), Community programmes and sources of finance 
(40,000 questions), internationalisation of SMEs (10,000 questions), EU legislation and 
public procurement (19,000 questions).39 However, the number of requests handled decreased 
by approximately 20% from 2002 to 2005. According to the European Commission, this trend 
is related to the changing nature of SMEs needs caused by the evolution of the Internal 
Market and by the increased awareness of final beneficiaries. Significant request decreases are 
observable in the EU15 were EICs have been present for a longer time and are now playing a 
more specialised advisory role. 40 Conversely, before accession the number of request in the 
EU10 was very high and the type of questions very basic. This has been changing after the 
enlargement and the requests handled in the new member states are becoming more complex 
and technical. A similar pattern is expected for Bulgaria and Romania in the next few years. 
Finally, another reason for the decrease in the number of inquiries is the growing use of 
Internet and online information services among SMEs.  
The expertise of the network is also made available to European companies through seminars, 
workshops, conferences, training sessions and trade fairs. More than 4,700 events were 
organised by EICs all over Europe in 2004 (up 48% from 2003), with an average of 19 events 
for every working day. 
Overall, these results suggest that the informative role played by EICs is in principle relevant, 
effective and useful. EICs offer an adequate response to the expectation of SMEs. Results vary 
between the single centres, with some being extremely proactive while others significantly 
lagged behind in terms of visibility and quality of outputs.  
Below, we provide more details on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and usefulness of 
EICs  
 
Relevance and usefulness 
The relevance of EICs can be assessed by collecting available information on the extent to 
which the Network is pursuing the overarching policy goal to which it is meant to contribute. 
This is the fifth objective of the MAP, i.e. “giving business easier access to Community 
support services, programmes and networks and improving the coordination of these 
facilities”. Indicators relevant to this objective are: 
• The awareness of SMEs of the existence of EICs and of the services they can provide; 
• Actual contacts between SMEs and EICs; 
• Reduction of transaction and information costs, e.g. whether EICs act as a one-stop-shop 
for SMEs with a European vocation located in their territory of competence.  
                                                 
39 MAP Implementation Report, supra, pag. 49. 
40 For example, the requests of information on public procurement and tenders were 9% of total requests in 2003, 
and only 4.7% in 2005. This decrease is attributable, at least partly, to the expansion of the Tender Alert 
services, which reportedly benefited 20,904 firms in 2003, and as many as 270,000 clients in 2004. For further 
details, EIC Annual reports, 2003 and 2004.   
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Based on data from the EIC 2004 Annual Report and the Commission’s MAP Implementation 
Report, it can be inferred that much efforts has been devoted to increase the level of SMEs 
awareness. EIC publications reportedly reached 5,800,000 clients out of a total population of 
23 million SMEs. These include leaflets, brochures, guides, bulletins, CD-ROMs and other 
publications. At the same time, however, the percentage of firms reached (approximately 
21%) could be improved.  
Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by INFYDE et al. (2005), there seems to be a 
significant gap between the awareness level reported by EICs (score: average 5 out 6) and the 
level reported by business organisations (3.5 out of 6). In addition, the awareness of SMEs 
seems to depend highly on the reputation of the local host organisation, and consequently 
varies significantly across EICs.  
In terms of actual contacts between SMEs and EICs, as already recalled, the latter replied to 
around 300,000 requests in 2005, a figure that has been significantly decreasing compared 
with previous years. All in all, this means that the EIC Network is adapting itself to the more 
complex needs of SMEs while maintaining its basic advisory role in less advanced markets, as 
the number and type of questions handled by each Info point demonstrates.  
In some occasions, EICs seem to act as real one-stop-shops for SMEs, whereas in other cases 
their role was depicted more as that of a “first-stop-shop”. The use of Tender Alert services 
also seems relevant to the achievement of the objective.  
 
Effectiveness and efficiency 
The main dimensions that seem to affect the effectiveness and efficiency of EIC’s activities 
are the following: 
• Reputation: the more the structure is rooted and reputed at the local level, the better the 
service;  
• Local characteristics: as centres are mainly financed with own resources, the level of 
development and the number of enterprises in the region concerned can influence the 
performance of a centre. 
• Internal management: the performance of a centre also depends on its internal 
management. Sometimes even small structures can be very proactive, depending on the 
human resources and significant variations in the performance of single points have been 
observed after a change in the management structure. However, it must also be observed 
that the priority setting of EICs is difficult to influence, as the centres are mainly 
dependent on own sources of revenues. 
According to the European Commission, the distribution of well performing and weak centres 
is not differentiated on a national basis even though countries like France, Germany and 
Ireland are praised for their effective EIC networks. In general every national network has its 
weak links whose shortcomings are remedied by other structures, while there are cases with 
weak national networks including very proactive info points.  
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the network could be improved by strengthening feedback 
mechanisms, training activities and exchange of best practices at the national level and 
communication mechanism to increase the awareness of SMEs about Community 
programmes. This is even more important as the complexity of SMEs requests is increasing 
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over the years and thus the exchange of best practice or intensified signposting activities can 
contribute to a growing quality of the service and adequate time response.   
A further element of complexity stems from the multiplication of Community networks 
similar to EICs, although less focused on SMEs. The 2003 EIC annual conference was 
widened to the participation of the IRC and BIC networks41 as a first concrete activity to bring 
the networks closer together and to exchange experiences and best practices. Moreover, the 
b2Europe initiative connecting the important networks42 to increase and coordinate support 
services to SMEs was launched in 2001 and its activities are welcomed by the business 
community.43 In spite of such initiatives, the evaluation by INFYDE et al. (2005) found that 
“actual overlapping of network services is low, but multiplication of Community networks 
without an apparent overall strategy was found to influence negatively visibility and 
acceptance at final addresses”.44  This means that the potential for inefficiencies related to 
overlapping networks should be kept under control in the coming years, especially in light of 
the broader scope of the MAP’s successor.  
INFYDE et al. (2005) also performed a cost-benefit analysis of the EIC network for one year, 
2002. Based on the direct contribution for 2002 (8,960,000 EUR) and data on outputs 
provided by EICs themselves, efficiency indicators for the EICs were calculated as illustrated 
below, in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Efficiency indicators for the EIC network (2002) 
OUTPUTS COSTS INDIVIDUAL OUTPUTS* 
Approx. 1,200 people working for EICs at local level 8,960,000 EUR 7,466.67 EUR 
5,682,391 clients received EIC information materials 8,960,000 EUR 1.58 EUR 
248,454 specialised advice services provided by EICs 8,960,000 EUR 36.06 EUR 
3,483 events organised 8,960,000 EUR 2,572.49 
222,371 participated at events organised by EICs 8,960,000 EUR 40.29 EUR 
361,053 total questions handled 8,960,000 EUR 24.82 EUR 
       *Outputs are calculated under the assumption that the whole budget is allocated to the selected activity. 
       Source: INFYDE et al. (2005) 
 
Similar figures can be provided also for subsequent years. In the MAP 2004 Work 
Programme, a number of performance indicators for the EIC network were identified. Table 9 
                                                 
41 The Innovation Relay Centres (IRCs) constitute a EU network whose activities are complementary and in 
some cases overlapping with those of the EICs. IRCs mainly target SMEs and facilitate transnational technology 
transfer by providing partner finding services, assistance in accessing innovation financing, organisation of 
technology brokerage events, and expert guidance. Business Innovation Centres (BICs) contribute to regional 
and local economic development through the creation of new innovative SMEs and innovative projects in 
existing SMEs. 
42 Participating Networks are: the EICs, IRCs, BICs, and other networks such as the European Employments 
Services (EURES) or FP6 national contact points. For further information, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/networks/b2europe/b2europe.html  
43 See, for example, UEAPME, Work Paper on the future of existing Community business support networks, 
December 2004. 
44 See INFYDE S.L./ Lacave Allemand & Asssociés (2005), cit., at 4. 
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below reports the scores for each performance indicator, based on the budget committed at the 
end of 2005 (18,994,669 EUR). 
Based on available data, EICs normally seem to obtain efficient results at a reasonable cost, as 
the centres also benefit from the host structure. The efficiency received a high score from the 
responsible unit within the Commission, as even poor performing centres manage to provide 
some information that the Commission would not access otherwise or with such a small 
incidence on Community budget (on average only 12-15% of an EIC’s financial needs are 
covered by EU financing).  
Nonetheless, the increased complexity of SMEs demands is starting to put EICs resources 
under strain. In other words, the funding of EICs has not really changed since 1987, while the 
quality and complexity of the services provided and thus their cost increased in many cases. 
As a consequence, every year some Info Centres (4 to 5 per year according to the responsible 
unit within the European Commission) have to close because the host structure has 
insufficient funding to continue the service. Moreover, contracts with each centre are signed 
on an annual basis a feature that influences the stability of the network and provides further 
incentive to close a centre when it becomes too burdensome for the host structure.45 The 
European Commission is aware of this problem, but the situation could not be changed within 
the context of the MAP due to existing Community financial rules. This won’t be the case 
after 2008, under the forthcoming Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme 
that will combine higher budgetary commitments with the use of “action grant” agreements 
with each EIC lasting more than one year. Against this background, it is important that the 
level of financial support reflects the changes occurred in the function of the network and that 
EICs delivering high quality and comprehensive advice to final beneficiaries receive adequate 
funding. For such reason, the ongoing projects for the rationalisation of the business support 
structures will be of crucial importance in light of the “SMEs Growth and Jobs strategy” and 
of the forthcoming CIP project.  
 
 
                                                 
45 Since 2004 Community funding for the EICs is regulated by an annual framework agreement that has been 
extended until 2006 together with the MAP and will probably be prolonged until the end of 2007, as the 
commitments under the CIP will start in 2008. This agreement sets the basis for specific one-year agreements 
(operating grants) with each Info Centre that establish the annual activities planning and the financing for the 
Centre. From 2008 these operating grants should become “action grants” and could last for more than one year. 
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Table 9 
Performance indicators for the EIC network (2005) 
CATEGORY INDICATOR(S) RESULT 
No. of companies in the EICs client database 3,000* 1. Participation 
Clients who receive the EIC info documents 5,000,000 copies sent 
Number of awareness-raising initiatives 4,700* 
Specialised advise services provided by EICs n.a 
No. of questions handled by EICs 300,000 
IPM cases encoded 5,700 
2. Deliverables/quantity 
Press articles and interviews 2,000 
% of EICs carrying out client satisfaction studies 80% 
% of EICs which have a response time policy 18% 
3. Deliverables/quality 
Participants to staff training sessions 650 (out of 1,650) 
a) network management  
 Deadline for contracts Respected 
 Deadline for EIC extension Delayed 
 Organisation of network campaigns 20 network events 
 Steering/Working group meetings 3 S.G. meetings 
 Organisation of Annual conference Respected 
b) training  
 No. of training session (and participants) 37 (750) 
c) Promotion  
 No. of promotional materials distributed 5,000,000 
4. Implementation 
 Number of EIC website hits 110,000 on EIC intranet 
Number of questions replied 1,579 
Number of Internet sites related to EU matters 4.74 
Number of Info Watch services 3.69 
Number of copies of information documents 
delivered 
30,535 
Number of Tender Alert services provided 1,421 
Number of events organised 0.11 
Number of articles or interviews in the media 10.53 
Number of companies which have received 
assistance in: 
 
 European programmes and projects 211 
 Public procurement 100 
 Legal and fiscal matters** 205 
 Business co-operation projects 263 
5. Effectiveness 
 
The indicator of effectiveness 
of the project is based on a 
non-exhaustive list of 
deliverables obtained with an 
expenditure of 100.000 EUR 
of the Commission budget 
(calculated as if 100,000EUR 
were dedicated exclusively to 
one action).  
Number of cases submitted in the IPM initiative 30 
* As of December 2004 
** Based on the percentage of questions related to EU legislation + Customs and taxation in the EIC Annual Report 2004 
(13%). 
 
EIC: the feedback role  
The feedback mechanism seems to be the weakest link in the generally satisfactory 
performance of EICs. In terms of relevance, the interface role between the EU and the local 
level is undisputed, but the results obtained so far are mixed and disappointing in many 
respects. 
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A positive aspect to be mentioned is the support and coordination provided to the EICs by DG 
Enterprise and by the Technical Assistance Office (TAO). Their role is generally appreciated 
by EICs and considered effective. Moreover, the TAO has an ad hoc team in charge of the 
regular evaluation of InfoCentres, which provides additional guidance to centres and ensures 
the follow-up of difficult cases.46 So far, the relatively small amount of human resources 
allocated to these tasks has generally managed to deliver the expected results, but the 
increasing complexity of an expanding network will soon require administrative and financial 
adjustments to ensure a smooth and effective functioning of these support services.  
To the contrary, the quality and – most importantly – the use made by Commission services of 
the information collected by EICs is quite unsatisfactory. There are some structural reasons 
behind this problem, which have hardly been overcome in the period covered by this study. 
Such problems are briefly illustrated below. 
Although the feedback role of the EICs was embedded in the network since the outset, 
concrete implementing measures and tools have been developed mostly during the last 5 
years, together with other similar Community feedback initiatives such as the Interactive 
Policy Making. Databases and data collection mechanisms were redesigned, new analytical 
tools were introduced, the number of stakeholder consultations on policy initiatives increased. 
As a consequence, a considerable administrative cultural change is taking place in the 
Commission and the results are not yet observable or quantifiable.  
In the specific case of EICs, general shortcomings are only partially related to the quality of 
the information collected by the Network or the need to adapt to the new instruments. Only in 
the first years there were some cases where the quality of information was sometimes poor, 
mainly because EICs were not given clear guidelines on which data to collect and on how to 
encode them in the system. The main problem until very recently is the lack of familiarity 
with the new databases and the use of different sources of information by Commission 
services. The ex-post evaluation of the MAP’s predecessor had already pointed out that there 
was insufficient knowledge of the activities of EICs in other DGs and even among DG 
Enterprise officials that are not directly involved in the Network’s activities. This problem has 
only been partially overcome under the MAP 2001-2005; therefore there is a considerable 
amount of information on SMEs that is now correctly encoded in the new databases but still 
underexploited. The responsible unit expects the first visible positive results in 2008, when 
the CIP will be implemented. 
Finally, as previously mentioned there is a risk that the EIC network overlaps with other 
Community networks and this problem is amplified by the lack of awareness on EIC activities 
in other Commission DGs. In the long run, ineffective feedback mechanisms could have a 
negative impact on the efficiency of the network: as EU funding strategies need to be 
reformulated in order to increase the ability of EICs to meet evolving SMEs demands, a lack 
of awareness on the actual features and limits of the existing networks among EU officials 
could lead to inefficient decisions on budget allocation.  
 
                                                 
46 Evaluation are carried out through various means such as data collection, monitoring of EIC websites and the 
quality of information provided online, visits to single centres, etc. 
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Table 10 
Summary of findings – EIC network 
Evaluation criteria Positive aspects Negative aspects 
Relevance • Appropriate objectives 
• Adequate use of budget 
• High potential of network 
structure 
• Responds to information gap 
between EU and local level 
• Funding allocation potentially 
underestimated for future needs 
• Feedback to EU level not 
sufficiently tackled 
• Administrative architecture and 
support structure potentially  
inadequate for the future 
Effectiveness • Information delivered on time 
• Update of staff competences & 
skills 
• Expansion of the network 
• Flexibility and adaptation to 
SMEs needs 
• Interactive Policy Making  
• Creation of a proactive attitude in 
some centres 
• Insufficient feedback to EU 
institutions 
• Some centres underperforming 
• Poor dissemination reduced 
potential positive impacts 
Efficiency • Balanced use of funding  
• Ability to survive on the market 
independently of EU support 
• Allocation of funding should 
reflect evolving needs of EICs 
• Advanced EICs insufficiently 
supported 
Utility • Adequate response to SMEs 
information needs 
• Provision of informed advisory 
services 
• Internationalisation of enterprises 
and business activities 
• Insufficient feedback to 
Commission services 
 
 
3.3 Concluding remarks 
On the basis of the data and evaluation provided in this section, it is possible to draw some 
conclusions on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and utility of the MAP running from 
2001 until the end 2006. The main findings of our evaluation can be summarised as follows: 
Relevance: overall the MAP is generally satisfactory, as the structure of the Programme 
covers the majority of SMEs needs and left only some aspects uncovered (e.g. the financial 
needs of firms in the pre-seed and expansion stages of their lives, e-learning initiatives).  
More specifically, the policy development pillar was generally relevant: the planned actions 
addressed areas that are relevant for the everyday life of European SMEs, with the only 
exception of some activities – such as one-off studies or the creation of complex databases – 
that did not respond to any specific needs among final beneficiaries, though mobilising a 
considerable amount of resources.  
Finally, the EIC network is a highly relevant structure as it responds to information needs of 
both SMEs and the European Commission. 
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Effectiveness: from the standpoint of effectiveness, the Programme achieved satisfactory 
results, and did not leave significant areas uncovered. In this respect, the policy development 
pillar appears as the less performing one for a number of reasons: first, because its 
effectiveness was affected by the presence of some small-scale measures or costly databases 
that did not deliver the expected results. Secondly, because some of the actions carried under 
this heading, in particular those with a strong political component, were often delayed or did 
not work out as expected. Finally, policy development indicators can be significantly 
improved, and often failed to fulfil their monitoring role, nor could serve as effective 
correction mechanisms for poorly performing projects. Nonetheless, very successful Best 
Projects were carried out under this heading: accordingly, these initiatives should be 
supported under the forthcoming CIP.  
The financial instruments that were concretely used such as the loan and microcredit 
guarantee windows and the ETF-SU scheme proved effective and exhibited high leverage 
ratios. Nonetheless, in the latter case the pari passu position of the EIF in targeted venture 
capital funds diminished their attractiveness for private investors.  
The ICT and equity guarantee windows and the Seed Capital Action performed less than 
initially forecasted. In terms of effectiveness, the most significant failure of this pillar is 
certainly the JEV, which reached a very limited number of final beneficiaries and is thus 
being phased out. Such failure is not without consequences: business representatives have 
pointed out that the role of the JEV in promoting international cooperation among European 
SMEs has not been replaced yet. 
Finally, the EIC pillar proved to be quite effective as far as its informative role towards SMEs 
is concerned; the Network is gradually improving and updating the services provided and 
increasingly plays a central role as a ‘one-stop-shop’ between SMEs and EU institutions. 
Such a positive judgement, however, cannot be applied to the EICs feedback mechanism to 
the Commission: this is probably due – at least partly – to the administrative cultural change 
taking place within the European Commission, but most of all because of an internal lack of 
awareness on the informative potential of the Network among Commission services.  
Efficiency: in terms of cost-effectiveness, the MAP produced mixed results. As often occurs 
with complex programmes, every pillar can be said to include both efficient projects with 
well-managed resources, and actions whose cost greatly exceeded the final output. 
Evaluating the policy development pillar in terms of cost-effectiveness is often difficult, as its 
expected outputs are of a qualitative nature (promoting entrepreneurship, fostering policy 
changes, etc.) and in most cases should be appraised in the long term. Committed resources 
were judged as being generally adequate by interviewed stakeholders, with the exception of 
one-off studies and databases that should be discontinued in the future, as they employed a 
considerable amount of financial resources without reaching many final beneficiaries. 
The average score of the financial pillar can be explained by the failure of the JEV 
programme and of the ICT guarantee window and the slower take up of the equity guarantee 
window and of the Seed Capital Action. In the latter case, an overestimated budget had to be 
reallocated, thus showing the importance of designing flexible financial instruments that can 
be adapted overtime to the changing needs of SMEs. 
The EIC network scores better in terms of efficiency as only 12-15% of a centre’s financial 
needs are covered by Community Funding, while the informative gains for the European 
Commission are potentially very high, as reported by the responsible unit. In order to reach 
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fully satisfactory results in terms of cost-effectiveness, the Commission should ensure a better 
use and dissemination of the information  provided and encoded by the Centres.   
Utility: the contribution of the MAP as a response to the different needs of European SMEs 
varies across the three policy pillars and is overall only partially satisfactory. If one focuses 
on the schemes that were actually used, the financial pillar was very useful: access to finance 
was made easier for SMEs and financial intermediaries took more risks than they would have 
done without Community intervention in this area. As previously mentioned, more could have 
been achieved for SMEs venture capital needs by changing the EIF’s pari passu position into 
targeted funds. Other drawbacks of the financial pillar, besides the failure of the JEV 
Programme, were the lack of success of the ICT guarantee window and the slow take up of 
the SCA. The former was too narrowly designed, but this problem was overcome by making 
relevant projects fall within the broader scope of the loan guarantee window. The 
disappointing performance of the SCA in terms of number of approved projects is 
compensated by the success of the two financed initiatives: this proves that the facility 
addresses specific needs of growing SMEs and is expected to deliver better outcomes under 
favourable market conditions.   
On a more general note, we would like to stress again that two factors played a crucial role in 
the overall performance of the MAP: the links between the different levels of the 
Programme’s structure and the general communication strategy. 
On the first point, in some cases the lack of a clear link between the general goals of the 
Programme and the specific pillars failed to provide sufficient guidance during the 
implementation phase. Shortcomings were not always identifiable in time, especially within 
the policy development pillar, and thus could not be corrected. As previously mentioned, 
when clear action guidelines were missing this was also observable in the quality and 
performance of selected indicators that did not manage to fulfil their task. 
One of the main shortcomings of the previous MAP was the ineffective communication and 
dissemination strategy both within the European Commission and to the outside world. Even 
though progress has been made, especially in the first case (with some notable exception such 
as the under-exploitation of the information provided by EICs), too often final beneficiaries 
were unaware of the existence of the MAP. Besides generating a lack of visibility of 
implemented policies and thus lower appreciation scores among final beneficiaries, the lack of 
communication resulted sometimes in missed opportunities. Thus, the full potential of the 
Programme and the positive spillover effects resulting from successful action have been 
underexploited.  
The results of this evaluation are summarised in table 11 below. 
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Table 11 
Summary of findings – MAP 2001/2005 
Pillar Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Utility Total 
Policy development ◕ ◑ ◑ ◑ ◑ 
Financial instruments ◕ ◑ ◑ ◑ ◑ 
EIC Network ● ◕ ◕ ◑ ◕ 
OVERALL MAP ◕ ◑ ◑ ◑ ◑ 
● = Fully satisfactory 
◕ = Generally satisfactory 
◑ = Partially satisfactory 
◔ = Insufficient 
○ = Failure 
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4 The CIP 2007-2013 
The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) will bring together several 
existing EU initiatives that support competitiveness, productivity and innovation. Designed 
within the framework of the revised Lisbon strategy, termed “partnership for growth and 
employment”, the CIP complements other EU actions such as cohesion activities, research 
activities, and the EU programme for lifelong learning, with the aim of simplifying 
Community interventions and making them more effective. The Programme’s aims are to 
generate economic growth, create more jobs and boost productivity, competitiveness and 
innovation capacity. The CIP will cover the 2007-2013 timeframe and has a total budget of 
€3,621 billion, as approved by the European Parliament on June 1, 2006. On an annual basis, 
this represents a budget increase of 60% compared to 2006 under the various equivalent 
predecessor programmes. It is estimated that more than 350,000 enterprises will benefit from 
the new Financial Instruments under CIP.  
The structure of the CIP was designed on the basis of ex-post evaluations of previous 
initiatives and draws from the results of a public consultation.47 The aim is to create a 
comprehensive framework while ensuring at the same time the necessary continuity with 
previous Community interventions.48  
The CIP will be implemented through three specific sub-programmes49:  
• the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme (EIP)  
• the ICT Policy Support Programme and  
• the Intelligent Energy Europe Programme.  
In particular, the EIP is the direct follow-up of the activities carried out under the MAP 2001-
2005, and will address enterprises’ needs in terms of access to finance, SMEs cooperation and 
support services; in addition, it will promote eco-innovation among enterprises, and will 
foster administrative and economic reforms. Moreover the EIP is also built on the 
LIFE_environment programme and the innovation activities of the 6th Framework Programme 
for Research and Technological Development (FP-RTD). This way, it should be possible to 
coordinate CIP actions with upcoming RTD/FP7 activities for industrial competitiveness and 
eco-innovation, in order to stimulate SMEs participation to research projects.  
Whilst building on tried and tested programmes, the CIP also includes many new elements 
specifically targeting SMEs such as: 
 the possibility for SMEs to access direct funding; 
                                                 
47 For more details, see European Commission, Community Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme – Summary of the results of the public consultation, Commission staff working document, annex 2, 
SEC(2005) 433. 
48 For example, the MAP, some of the actions carried out under the 5th and 6th RTD Framework Programmes, 
activities on the promotion and demonstration of environmental technologies covered by the Life Programme, 
ICT-focused programmes such as Modinis, eContent and eTen, the multiannual programme for action in the 
field of energy, Intelligent Energy – Europe. For further details, see European Commission, Commission staff 
working document, Annex to the Proposal for a Decision of the European   Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007-2013), COM (2005) 121 final, 
p.11. 
49 In addition, Eco-innovation will be a transversal theme of the whole programme with a budget of € 430 
million. 
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 a risk capital instrument for high growth and innovative companies to bridge the “valley 
of death”; 
 “securitisation” of banks’ SME loan portfolios to free up lending capacity; 
 leverage venture capital for innovative SMEs to commercialise their research results; 
 incentives for joint actions grouping public and semi-public business innovation 
programmes at the national or regional level; 
 enhanced role for innovation and business support networks, with the creation of one-
stop-shops combining the EIC and the Innovation Relay Centres (IRC) networks. 
The majority of innovative elements are linked to the financial instruments conceived to 
facilitate access to finance for SMEs. In this respect, clear guidelines for future schemes and 
criteria for intervention have already been provided both by the European Commission and 
the European Investment Fund.  
The three existing financial schemes have been modified on the basis of the experience gained 
throughout the years. Thus, the budget for the SMEG facility has been increased to about 
EUR 468 million and will comprise four specific windows: the existing loan and microcredit 
windows will be continued, while the ICT and the equity ones will be replaced by an equity 
and mezzanine guarantee facility and by an SME loan securitisation risk-sharing scheme. The 
ETF-SU has been redesigned with a stronger focus on the needs of innovative companies and 
an increased budget of EUR 518m, in line with the strong innovation goals of the CIP itself.50 
As a consequence, established venture capital facilities will be complemented by funding for 
the expansion stage of innovative companies and co-investment in side-funds with business 
angels. Nonetheless, the pari passu approach followed by the EIF has not been changed under 
the CIP: according to interviewed business representatives, this is one of the most significant 
missed opportunities for boosting private investment in risk capital instruments targeting 
SMEs. Finally, as far a capacity building is concerned, the SCA will be continued and 
complemented by the financing of partnerships with International Financial Institutions, an 
initiative that should prove particularly useful in countries where banking intermediation and 
credit to the private sector is significantly lower than the EU average. 
As regards the leverage effect, the Commission has estimated that in the CIP programme the 
figure for SMEG will fall from (70:1) down to (60:1), and that the leverage of VC funds will 
remain approximately at (5:1). Table 12 summarises the main differences between the MAP 
and CIP programmes as far as the financial instruments pillar is concerned.   
                                                 
50 The facility has been renamed “High Growth and Innovative SME Facility (GIF)”. 
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Table 12 
MAP and CIP financial instruments: a comparison 
MAP 2000-2006 
Budget: € 400 million 
CIP 2007-2013 
Budget: € +/-1 billion 
ETF-Start-ups  
(€ 170 m) 
 VC early-stage investments  
 
 
 
 
Leverage effect: 5:1 
Mobilised funds: approx €0.85 bn 
High Growth and Innovative SME Facility 
(€ 518 m) 
 VC funds: 
− Early stages  
− Expansion stages for innovative 
companies  
 
 Co-investments in side-funds with 
business angels   
Leverage effect: 5:1 
Mobilised funds: approx. €2.5 bn 
CIP and EIB risk capital mandate for 
the period 2007-2013 (est.):   
10% of the European VC market (base:  
2005 early-stage investments EVCA 
Annual Report).  
SME Guarantee Facility  
(€ 340 m) 
• loan guarantee window 
• micro-credit window 
• equity guarantee window  
• ICT window  
Leverage effect: 70:1 
Mobilised funds: approx. €24 bn. 
SME Guarantee Facility  
(€ 468 m) 
• loan guarantee window 
• micro-credit window 
• equity and mezzanine guarantee window 
• SMEs securitisation 
Leverage effect: 60:1 
Mobilised funds: approx. €30 bn. 
Capacity Building  
(€ 60 m) 
• Seed Capital Action 
 
Capacity Building  
(€ +/- 100 m)  
• Seed Capital Action 
• Financing of partnerships with 
international financial institutions. 
Source: Elaboration on European Commission, MEMO/06/259, 30 June 2006 
 
4.1 A first assessment of the CIP: problems tackled and areas for 
improvement 
The information available on the planned functioning of the CIP financial instruments shows 
how the relevance and the effectiveness of these types of programmes depend on past 
experience and lesson-drawing. The existence of the praised three-tiered implementation 
chain DG Enterprise-DG Ecfin-EIF and the availability of indicators and adequate monitoring 
and feedback mechanisms facilitate the design of effective and efficient instruments. As a 
result, existing schemes have been made more flexible, in accordance with SMEs needs; 
initially inefficient funding allocation – as happened with the SCA – could be corrected over 
time; and inefficient windows of the SMEG facility have been closed and replaced with 
equity and securitisation schemes, which appear more tailored to the needs of final 
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beneficiaries. More importantly, the need to boost innovation and the importance of high-tech 
start-ups for the European economy is reflected in the fact that the budget allocated to venture 
capital funds has been significantly increased. These modifications are expected to close the 
gaps in access to finance that are still open in the market, with the hope of fostering the 
creation of a well-functioning venture capital market in Europe.  
The potential of these innovations will be visible only after 2008, when real implementation 
will start. Nonetheless, the objective to triplicate the European early-stage venture capital 
market to EUR 6bn by the end of 2013 could already serve as an indicator to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the new instruments when they will be implemented.51 A possible obstacle to 
the achievement of this goal lies in the pari passu approach applied to the participation of the 
EIF in targeted funds. According to business representatives, the shortcomings of this 
approach might be partially compensated by other Community programmes such as 
JEREMIE52, but could have been solved more effectively by changing the size of the EIF 
participation into venture capital funds (up to 50% and 70% in the case of eco-innovation). 
Conversely, the innovative components linked to the policy development area do not seem as 
clearly defined:  
 During the consultations, some stakeholders, especially SMEs representatives, expressed 
the fear that the creation of a comprehensive framework programme gathering all pre-
existing actions might be confusing and weaken the impact of the single components. 
Thus, a clear request for a sharper focus on key activities and structured guidelines for 
their implementation was expressed.53  
 Moreover, SMEs representatives pointed out that the CIP refers only marginally to some 
crucial and appreciated initiatives such as the European Charter for Small Enterprises and 
the Action Plan on Entrepreneurship, a fact that might give the impression that positive 
results achieved so far through these instruments could be weakened by the CIP.54 
 There seems to be a strong need for an initiative on e-learning for SMEs. Such gap already 
existed in the MAP, as mentioned above in Section 3, and was not addressed so far in the 
CIP.  
Against this background, some of the critics and recommendations contained in the ex-post 
evaluation of the MAP become even more important in the context of the “holistic” approach 
adopted by the CIP. In particular, the link between overall objectives and specific goals 
should be carefully substantiated by providing clear guidelines for the different actions. In 
some cases the possibility of introducing multiannual planning with some flexibility and room 
for change should be considered, rather than sticking to a strict annual programming 
                                                 
51 According o the European Commission, Memo (2006) cit., this expectation is based on the following 
assumptions: this is the level that leading member states such as UK, Sweden and Denmark have already 
achieved and exceeded and it is the level where the Us is already in its early-stage investment. 
52 JEREMIE stand for Joint European Resources for Micro to Medium Enterprises. The programme will enable 
EU member states and regions to use part of their structural funds to obtain a set of financial instruments 
specifically designed to support micro enterprises and SMEs. If appropriately coordinated with CIP initiatives, 
JEREMIE could contribute to the development of European early-stage venture capital markets.   
53 For more details, see European Commission, Community Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme – Summary of the results of the public consultation, Commission staff working document, annex 2, 
SEC(2005) 433. 
54 See for example, UEAPME, UEAPME’s Position Paper on the Consultation Document on a Framework 
Programme for Competitiveness and Innovation, February 2005. 
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timetable, especially as far as complex projects are concerned (for example, the Observatory 
on European SMEs). The shortcomings found in the identification and use of indicators have 
been underlined many times both by the Commission and external evaluators. There is a clear 
indication that these tools can play a key role during the implementation of the single actions 
and thus their functionality should be accordingly ensured. This means that, for each project, 
specific goals and measurable benchmarks should be set in advance in order to ensure that 
problems are detected and corrected in time.55 As already stated, the observed smoother 
functioning of the financial pillar can be attributed to its better internal and inter-institutional 
communication mechanisms, which could be replicated in the other components of the CIP.  
The role of the EICs will remain crucial during the 2007-2013 period and the expected 
positive changes deriving from the recent redesign of the network’s feedback function will 
probably be observable during this timeframe. As far as the informational role of the EICs is 
concerned, it is essential that adequate human and financial resources are dedicated to the 
EIC network and that its most effective centres are adequately supported. Some stakeholders 
suggested that the EICs should be given a broader mandate in implementing the Programme, 
for example contributing to enhance the visibility of the financial instruments to remedy some 
of the informational gaps observed in the past.56 This suggestion should be taken into account. 
Most importantly, the Commission should ensure that the feedback contribution provided by 
the EICs is used and fulfils its potential as a tool to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of 
implemented activities and inspire future policy orientations. We recommend that the 
launching of the CIP be used as an opportunity to communicate effectively and strongly the 
role of EICs within the Commission, to prevent the loss or misuse of precious information on 
European SMEs and ensure that the potential of the network is fully exploited. 
Furthermore, the MAP 2001-2005 only partially remedied to the communication and 
dissemination problems exhibited by its predecessor; against this backdrop, it is not yet clear 
whether and how the CIP intends to score better in this field. As previously mentioned, weak 
communication not only affected the visibility of the Programme and the perception of final 
beneficiaries on the relevance of EU intervention in this area, but in some cases was one of 
the main causes of missed opportunities. Some financial beneficiaries failed to take part to 
existing schemes and did not support local SMEs by lack of information on existing 
programmes. In the case of the EIC Network, the best results in terms of SMEs support and 
feedback mechanisms to the Commission were obtained by pro-active centres that were 
directly approaching and involving SMEs. When this did not happen, opportunities were 
missed. The possibility of setting up an ad hoc “communications” budget line in addition to 
                                                 
55 A positive signal in this direction is already observable in the Communication establishing the Programme. 
Annex II on the implementation arrangements for the Community financial instruments for SMEs states (point 5) 
that “The external evaluations shall assess the impact of the Community financial instruments for SMEs and 
provide a qualitative analysis of achieved results, in particular, by assessing the leverage effect and cost-benefit 
of each instrument. The evaluation reports shall present statistical data, including: 
• for the GIF, the number of SMEs reached and the number of jobs created; for the SMEG Facility, the total 
volume of loans provided by the financial intermediaries to SMEs and the number of SMEs reached; 
• for the Seed Capital action, the number of organisations supported and the volume of seed capital 
investments; 
• for the Partnership action, the number of intermediaries supported and SMEs reached; 
• any specific outputs relating to eco-innovation. 
Appropriate visibility shall be given to the results and lessons learned from the reports of the external evaluators 
and to the sharing of best practices among stakeholders”. 
56 See the results of the public consultation, cit. 
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the dissemination initiatives foreseen under the different components of the Programme 
should be considered. An adequate communication strategy should not only focus on the 
description and presentation of the Programme and its objectives, but also on the effective 
presentations of implemented activities and their results. In particular business organisations 
should be the primary target of these informative campaigns, as their potential as a 
communication channel with final beneficiaries is underexploited. In this respect, one 
interviewee suggested that the CIP foresees specific calls for tenders directed to business 
organisations for promoting the Programme among their national member organisations and 
SMEs.57 Here again, the importance of setting clear implementation guidelines for the 
operational level of the Programme is key to ensure that concrete results, rather than mere 
declarations of good intentions, reach the targeted audience.   
The ex-ante impact assessment carried out by the European Commission for the CIP mentions 
some possible drawbacks in terms of employment in traditional sectors, as a result of the 
forecasted shift of resources towards innovative and “gazelle” enterprises. The data provided 
by the Commission on the entity and nature of such problem is not extensive, and there is no 
indication about potential remedies and adjustments in case such situations occur. In this 
respect, business associations stress the fact that the needs of traditional sectors, that still 
constitute the majority of European SMEs and account for a significant share of total 
employment, might be insufficiently addressed by the CIP.58 Such concerns have been taken 
into account by accepting the OECD definition of innovation, which covers also traditional 
SMEs undergoing innovative changes.  
The impact of Community support to facilitate the international cooperation of SMEs has 
progressively weakened after programmes such as the JEV, JOOP and Interprise have been 
terminated. Even though this function is partially carried out by the EICs Network, business 
organisations suggest that new direct support projects for SMEs in this field should be 
foreseen under the CIP as trans-national cooperation increases SMEs’ abilities to face the 
challenges of globalisation.59 This would also increase the European Union’s visibility among 
final beneficiaries, which is one of the missed targets of the previous MAPs. 
Finally, the strengthened focus on research and the proposed coordination with other relevant 
Community measures such as the RTD Framework Programme must be welcomed as the 
right approach for achieving Europe’s growth and employments goals. SMEs need to 
participate more actively in research programmes and the results of finalised activities funded 
under the RTD Framework Programme need to be more effectively disseminated and 
exploited. This view is shared by SMEs representatives, who advocate for a greater 
involvement of SMEs into research as a crucial step to strengthen the link between innovation 
and its market uptake. They clarify that greater coordination between the CIP and RTD 
programmes should not imply the transfer into the CIP of the portion of the RTD budget 
reserved for SMEs. As a matter of fact, the two programmes support different aspects of 
innovation: the CIP addresses both technological as well as non-technological aspects of 
innovation and focuses on the downstream stages of the research and innovation process, by 
                                                 
57 CGPME, the French SMEs association. 
58 See for example, UEAPME (2005), cit.  
59 According to UEAPME, cit., such programmes “should facilitate the organisation of transnational co-
operation events and entrepreneurial days (e.g., in the area of financial and technical cooperation or marketing 
and purchasing cooperation) and support SMEs and Skilled Craft enterprises whishing to access European 
neighbouring markets”. 
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facilitating technology transfer and use and the market uptake of existing new technologies. 
The FP7-RTD, instead, will support trans-national cooperation in research, technological 
development and demonstration, in particular between enterprises and public research 
organisations, of specific RTD schemes in favour of SMEs, and of researcher’s mobility 
between firms and academia.60 Both community actions are needed to strengthen the link 
between research outputs and SMEs needs and should not be weakened by merging different 
activities with differing goals.  
 
                                                 
60 For further details, see the European Commission’s Communication on the CIP, cit. 
EVALUATION OF THE MAP 2001-2005 AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CIP | 45 
 
Conclusion and summary of findings 
Community programmes targeting SMEs proved to be generally relevant as they are normally 
very broad in scope and thus include different areas of intervention. This characteristic has 
been an asset so far, but should be dealt with carefully under the CIP in order to prevent a 
decrease in the effectiveness and impact of the single components/pillars of the Programme. 
In this respect, as pointed out many times in this report, sound intervention logic with clearly 
defined specific and operational objectives is a crucial ingredient for the Programme’s 
success. Thus, focusing on key objectives should be a priority of the forthcoming CIP and this 
strategy should be backed by the use of well-designed and performing indicators.  
Another aspect that emerged through this evaluation is the value of lesson-drawing and its 
positive impact both on the efficiency and effectiveness of the actions carried out under the 
MAP. For example, the informative role of the EICs emerges as one of the most useful and 
effective actions of the MAP: this is mainly attributable to the fact that the EIC Network is 
established since 1987 and acquired a thorough knowledge of final beneficiaries and evolved 
in line with their needs. Conversely, the feedback role of the EICs scored poorly, as its 
functioning has only recently been redesigned and potential benefits have not been 
internalised yet. The lesson-drawing component is also visible within the financial pillar and 
has been confirmed by interviewed stakeholders. In this respect, adequate internal feedback 
mechanisms and the exchange of best practices at the level of project management should be 
ensured to increase the impact of the lesson-drawing component of the implemented actions. 
Increased familiarity with the Programme and its components could also have an impact on 
the flexibility of interventions, an element that was key for the successful initiatives carried 
out under the financial pillar: the possibility of detecting the overestimation of the SCA 
budget in a timely manner allowed the reallocation of resources in an efficient manner.  
As stated above in section 3, the MAP 2001-2005 remedied many of the shortcomings of its 
predecessor, but did not deliver satisfactory results in terms of communication and 
dissemination strategy. As far as the communication between Commission’s DGs is 
concerned, progress has been made and even in the most critical areas, such as the EICs 
feedback mechanism, Commission Services have introduced significant changes, whose 
results will only be visible in the medium-long term. The same cannot be said of the external 
communication strategy of the MAP. Despite successful initiatives such as the Europe 
Enterprise Newsletter and the increased availability of relevant information online, the 
Programme’s visibility is still weak among final beneficiaries. Such a problem could be 
aggravated by the even broader scope of the CIP and by the fact that individual components 
might be perceived as weaker by their targeted beneficiaries. An adequate communication 
strategy should be one of the priorities of the CIP. The possibility of setting up a dedicated 
budget line for this purpose should be foreseen together with the possibility of increasing the 
involvement of business associations in the dissemination strategy.  
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Table 13 
Summary of findings – MAP 2001/2005 
PILLAR RELEVANCE EFFECTIVENESS EFFICIENCY UTILITY 
Policy 
development 
Generally high 
- Successful 
coverage of many 
SMEs needs 
- Insufficient 
consideration of e-
learning aspects 
- One-off studies and 
databases not 
responding to 
specific needs of 
final beneficiaries 
Mixed 
- Highly effective 
best projects 
- Ineffective one-off 
studies and 
databases 
- Strong influence of 
the political 
dimension on some 
projects 
- Impact of weak 
indicators strongly 
felt in this pillar 
Mixed  
with some results 
visible only in the 
long term: 
- On average projects 
were efficient with 
an acceptable 
average cost  
   Small scale 
measures, one-off 
studies and 
databases 
mobilised 
considerable 
resources without 
reaching many 
final beneficiaries 
Very high  
for best projects with 
clearly defined goals 
 
Mixed  
for measures with a 
strong political 
component or with 
weak indicators 
 
Low  
for one-off studies, 
databases and some 
small scale measures 
Financial 
instruments 
Mixed  
High for loan and 
good for microcredit  
guarantee schemes 
and ETF-SU facility 
as they addressed the 
need for easier 
access to finance of 
SMEs. 
SMEs financial 
needs in the pre-seed 
and expansion phase 
not covered 
The role of 
intermediaries is 
insufficiently 
considered 
Mixed 
High for loan 
guarantee window. 
Satisfactory for 
microcredit 
guarantee window. 
Partially 
disappointing for 
ETF-SU scheme, 
due to pari passu 
approach 
Slow take up of 
equity guarantee 
window and SCA 
Failure of JEV and 
ICT guarantee 
window 
Mixed 
High for  loan and 
microcredit 
guarantee windows 
and ETF-SU scheme 
Flexibility allowed 
efficient reallocation 
of overestimated 
SCA budget 
Slow take up of 
equity guarantee 
window 
Failure of JEV  
Very high  
for successful 
schemes: increased 
access to finance and 
FI taking higher risks 
Low for the 
disappointing initial 
performance of SCA  
JEV not yet 
replaced, while 
SMEs international 
cooperation still 
needs to be 
supported 
Need to change the 
EIF pari passu 
approach 
EIC 
Network 
Very high 
The Network 
responds to 
information needs of 
both SMEs and the 
European 
Commission, 
however the 
percentage of SMEs 
reached could be 
improved 
High  
for informative role 
to SMEs, provision 
of advisory services, 
adequate 
compensation of 
weak centres 
Lower but promising 
for feedback 
function due to 
undergoing cultural 
change within the 
EC 
High 
The EC covers only 
a small portion of 
EICs funding needs 
while informative 
gains are potentially 
very high. A better 
exploitation of the 
feedback function 
would ensure an 
even higher score in 
terms of efficiency 
High  
for the informative 
role towards SMEs. 
Weak centres should 
be reinforced 
Low but promising 
for the feedback 
function as encoded 
information is 
already available 
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As regards the forthcoming CIP, the most positive findings include the greater flexibility 
introduced in the budget allocation, the significant increase in the budget allocated to venture 
capital funds and the strengthened focus on research. However, there seem to remain 
important areas for improvement, which can be summarised in the following suggestions. 
1. The creation of a comprehensive framework programme gathering as many as nine pre-
existing programmes might be confusing and weaken the impact of the single 
components.  
2. The CIP seems to be referring only marginally to crucial and appreciated initiatives such 
as the European Charter for Small Enterprises and the Action Plan on Entrepreneurship. 
3. Projects should be launched to foster trust between money-seeking companies, financial 
actors and intermediaries (accountants and AOs) to promote stronger cooperation in 
assessing credit risks, building credit histories and future financial development.  
4. An initiative on e-learning for SMEs should be foreseen, to help all SMEs (both high-tech 
and traditional) go digital. 
5. The link between overall objectives and specific goals should be carefully substantiated 
by providing clear guidelines for the different actions. 
6. There is a strong need for identifying measurable indicators and benchmarks, to facilitate 
the monitoring of project outcomes. 
7. The internal and inter-institutional communication mechanisms of the policy development 
pillar could be streamlined and made more effective by borrowing from the organisational 
arrangements set for the financial instruments pillar.  
8. Adequate human and financial resources should be dedicated to the EIC Network, 
especially to its most effective centres. This also implies the setting up of monitoring tools 
to identify best and worst performing EICs. 
9. The EICs should be given a broader mandate in enhancing the visibility of the financial 
instruments.  
10. The Commission should ensure that the feedback contribution provided by the EICs is 
used and fulfils its potential as a tool to monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of 
implemented activities.  
11. The possibility of setting up an ad hoc “communications” budget line in addition to the 
dissemination initiatives foreseen under the different components of the Programme 
should be considered. 
12. The CIP foresees specific calls for tenders directed to business organisations for 
promoting the Programme among their national member organisations and SMEs.  
13. New direct support projects for the internationalisation of SMEs should be included in the 
CIP Work Programme. 
14. There should be stronger coordination (but not overlap) between the CIP and the RTD 
Framework Programme. 
15. Strong coordination with the JEREMIE programme should be ensured to magnify the 
impact of Community intervention on the development of early-stage venture capital 
markets in Europe.   
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